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ABSTRACT
 
Social theorists have generally classified:the ,
 
phenomenon of holy war in one of two ways. One school,
 
comprised mainly of secular scholars, has regarded religious
 
rhetoric at face value, assuming that because Jews,
 
Christians and Muslims share a history of holy war advocacy
 
in the development of their respective traditions, holy war
 
is the inevitable consequence of recurring.religious
 
fanaticism. The other..school, in an attempt, to fashion a
 
more spiritually minded discourse, portrays it as an
 
imperfect human at:tempt to aspire to a nobler ethic, an
 
actualization of the struggle between good and evil in the
 
physical environment of competition. Both approaches are
 
fundamentally flawed. The first does not adequately apply
 
self-defined social scientific methodology to the study of
 
holy war, both in the examination of its latent and manifest
 
functions, or in its relative value as an instrument of
 
ideology. The second is but a thinly disguised attempt to
 
defend the concept of religious militancy and to effectively
 
canonize its various practitioners. Using ,the following
 
methodolbgy, I.will demonstrate how .holy war was waged as a
 
particular strategy of theocratic ideology and.facilitated
 
the cooperation of various constituencies in pursuit of
 
specific political and social agendas:
 
(1) Discussion, of the socio-political environments in which
 
theocracies (and then social movements) developed and
 
advocated holy war concepts in Judaic, Christian, and
 
Islamic history.
 
(2) Examination of holy war advocacy and its related
 
political agenda, vis-a-vis, the use of religion as
 
ideology and propaganda in Judaic, Christian, and Islamic
 
theocracies and social movements.
 
(3)Analysis of holy war's theoretical development and
 
philosophical approach in Judaic, Christian, and Islamic
 
tradition.
 
(4) Consideration of Holy Scripture's role in justifying and
 
explaining an accepted context of holy war in Judaic,
 
Christian, and Islamic culture.
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INTRODUCTION
 
It is the purpose of this thesis project to illustrate
 
how holy war concepts, particularly in the Judaic, Christian
 
and Islamic traditions, were instruments of religious
 
ideology formulated by theocratic states in an attempt to
 
promote a sense of cultural and political unity in times of
 
crisis. Additionally, it will be demonstrated that once
 
these concepts were legitimized through state sanction they
 
were effectively absorbed into the prevalent social
 
environment, becoming effectual activist ideologies. The
 
holy war mentality, therefore, appealed to a variety of
 
socio-political movements in pursuit of credibility and
 
political cohesion. At both the state and activist level,
 
religion performed two functions. First, it served as a
 
comprehensive ideology from which a common culture could be
 
proselytized. Secondly, it acted as a propagandistic
 
instrument, providing justification for the relevant
 
political agenda and giving the average foot-soldier (or
 
activist) a compelling, if uncomplicated, reason to fight.
 
It is the intent of this thesis project to de-mystify the
 
process by which holy war has been waged throughout history
 
and to dispel the notion that the so-called "religious wars"
 
of the past Were the mere results of human fanaticism and
 
spiritual excess.
 
To facilitate a discussion in which holy war is seen as
 
an element of political strategy that has historically
 
utilized religion both as ideology and propaganda,
 
consideration must be given to the definition of terms-

Webster's New Lexicon refers to theocracy as "government by
 
priests or men claiming to know the will of God".^ This ,
 
definition, in a general sense, ignores the symbiotic
 
relationship between religion and politics and, more
 
specifically, eludes the process by which religious concepts
 
are expropriated, even mis-applied, by the power structure:
 
and utilized to their ultimate political advantage. This
 
ambiguity of terms belies a larger academic malaise
 
concerning the general topic of religion, one which
 
perpetuates the unfortunate prejudices of centuries past.
 
If the social sciences can do no better than to suggest that
 
theocracies necessarily react to crises with an appeal to
 
fanaticism, then to what extent may we Say that the
 
principles of objective science have been applied at all?
 
The ultimate ethic of Science is objectivity. It seems the
 
study of religion has been infected with a secular bias to .
 
the extent that a meaningful definition of holy war has been
 
replaced with the simplistic formula of fanaticism. Surely
 
science can do better.
 
By definition, a theocracy is a type of government.
 
Governments are involved in the struggle for power, both
 
externally through foreign policies and diplomatic
 
relations, and internally as they interact with various
 
demographic groups within their own populations. This
 
attempt to consolidate power results in actual, not
 
phantasmic or ethereal, conflicts that, in turn, demand
 
practical solutions. Despite the nature of theocratic
 
power, and its origins in the development of spiritual
 
charisma (and, consequently, privileged status), the
 
political realities of government/ theocratic or otherwise,
 
always necessitate a political, perhaps even worldly,
 
response. In the absence of any pre-existing political
 
ideology (which is really a phenomenon of the last few
 
centuries), theocracies may appeal to sentiments that
 
reflect the broadest cross-section of their populations and
 
that help to provide the very basis of their legitimacy and
 
access to power: i.e., religious beliefs. This does not
 
presume that any given population is unified in a common
 
political or religious struggle; rather, religious ideology
 
appears during periods of intense crisis, when the socio­
economic and political environment is threatened by
 
disunity, precisely as a method by which a particular
 
constituency may prevail and lead the community in a
 
decisive fashion. Thus, within middle-eastern Judaism there
 
were indegenous Canaanite populations to contend with, among
 
Christians warring nobles hampered unity, and in the Arab
 
world powerful inter-tribal rivalries threatened to
 
extinguish the young Islamic nation.
 
A word must be said here concerning the use of the term
 
"nation" in the body of this paper. It is commonly held
 
that nation-states are a product of the.modern political
 
era. It is certainly true that modern states possess more
 
complex political ideologies and maintain more highly
 
developed economic systems than did ancient societies.
 
Borders are better established and national identity secured
 
in a more methodical fashion than in the past. But surely,
 
there are exceptions to this rule; witness the birth pangs
 
of nationhood in Boznia-Herzogovina and the struggle for
 
ethnic identity in government. Additionally, ancient
 
societies were possessed of fully operational (if not
 
complex) economic systems; they maintained long distance
 
trade with other states, enforced well-established
 
geographic borders, and developed cultural ties that held
 
their people together in times of crisis. This latter
 
characteristic may be viewed as a primitive "nationalism"
 
precisely because it performed the same function during the
 
creation of states in the modern era. As a method of
 
creating this nationalism, theocratic states utilized the
 
ideology of religion just as surely as modern states utilize
 
political ideology in the pursuit; of legitimacy. For this
 
reason I used the terms nation^ state and kingdom
 
interchangeably within the body of this text^
 
The comroonly held definition of ideblogy is profoundly
 
vague. Once again, WebsterVs New Lexicon secondarily refers
 
to ideology as "the way of thinking of a class, culture or
 
individual", and this seems to be the commonly accepted
 
definition of the word.- The primary definition, however,
 
is "a body of ideas used in support of an economic,
 
political or social theory [italics added] The difference 
between the two definitions, in fact, highlights the central 
issues involving theocratic power. The more common, 
secondary definition suggests that ideology is a separate ■ 
phenomenon contingent only upon the whims of aggregate
 
groups. The primary, or more accurate, definition ties
 
ideology to the implementation of specific"economic,
 
political or social" agendas. Ideologies, then, are
 
responses to real issues and not the residual consequence of
 
human passion. Religion, as an ideology, can be said to
 
possess a practical dimension that eschews fanaticism, but
 
will avail itself of demagogy when impending crises preclude
 
satisfactory explanations.
 
The Institute for Propaganda Analysis has defined
 
propaganda as "The expression of opinions or actions carried
 
out deliberately by individuals or groups with a view to
 
influencing the opinions or actions of other individuals or
 
groups for predetermined ends and through psychological
 
manipulations."^ The "predetermined ends" of theocratic
 
government differ little from those of other states:
 
political stability, economic viability and territorial
 
integrity.
 
In each chapter, I attempted to define terms specific
 
to the topic discussed. For example, in the chapter dealing
 
with Islamic holy war (which is an institutional and
 
political reality), I was mindful of the distinguishing
 
characteristics of jihad as a religious concept that
 
actually mitigated against its inclusion as a holy war •
 
theory at all. Initially, it was enough to have working
 
definitions of the main ideas central to this thesis,
 
namely: theocracy, ideology, and propaganda. It is hoped
 
that through the process of academic discussion concerning
 
this topic, a consensus may be achieved for a clear
 
definition of holy war, unhindered by the biases of the
 
past. For purposes of clarity I chose to utilize the term
 
"Middle East" to describe the geographic location of
 
 Mesopatamia, Arabia, Egypt, and the Levant. The term
 
"southwest asia" seems vague and non-specific.
 
In order to emphasize the connection between
 
theocracies and holy war concepts, I arbitrarily chose to•
 
end discussion of its development at specific intervals in
 
Judaic, Christian and Islamic history. For obvious reasons
 
(chiefly, the absence of an Israelite kingdom- after the
 
Jewish diaspora of the first century B.C.E.), the topic of
 
Judaic holy war can be seriously entertained only up until
 
the period of Roman occupation in Palestine (and Certainly
 
no further than the Bar Kokhba; rebellion of.132-135 G.E.).
 
In the case of Christianity, I regarded the Crusades as the
 
.quintessential expression of ^.Christian holy war, and so 1
 
stopped there, pne could argue that the religious wars of
 
Europe possessed an element of religious sanction, but if .
 
they did, the extent of that sanction certainly paled,in
 
comparison to that of the medieval Crusades. In many ways,
 
the warring constituencies of the Reformation and Counter-

Reformation represented social movements that derived their
 
holy war mentality and religious ideology from the
 
theocratic kings and popes of the Middle Ages. Similarly, I
 
assigned'the period of Ottoman hegemony to; represent the
 
apex of Islamic holy war concepts in the east.
 
Originally, it was my intent to: discuss modern
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 extremist groups and their utilization of holy war as an
 
ideological instrument. In fact, all the requisite elements
 
of the historical period apply to the modern era. Zionism
 
■ ' ■ ■ . 
began as a socio-political movement, utilizing holy war
 
themes that had remained dormant since the Jewish Diaspora.
 
These themes were easily transferrable to the establishment
 
of the Israeli state, which, in many respects, resembles a
 
modern theocracy. Similarly, many modern Christian and
 
Islamic political movements have expropriated holy war
 
themes in pursuit of their immediate agendas simply because
 
concepts of holy war have been accepted socially and
 
culturally in their respective religious traditions for
 
centuries. If the socio-political conditions that
 
precipitated the advent of these modern extremist groups
 
were adequately analyzed, they would confirm the basic
 
contention of my thesis: that governments or groups, in the
 
absence of an alternative ideology, will avail themselves of
 
the cohesive properties of religion in response to specific
 
social or political crises. Unfortunately, due to the
 
length and breadth of the historical period, and given the
 
restrictions governing the size of this thesis project,. I
 
relegated discussion of the modern era to future research.
 
A Survey of the Literature
 
Primary Sources;
 
To a certain extent, I regarded Judaic, Christian, and
 
Islamic Holy Scriptures as valuable first-hand accounts;
 
throughout my research, I used reliable translations for
 
these and other primary sources. Both the New Testament and
 
the Qur'an were produced rather early on in the development
 
of their respective faiths. Hebrew worship of YHWH, on the
 
other hand, preceded the formulation of Scripture by nearly
 
seven hundred years. Therefore, I found it necessary to
 
distinguish Judaic perceptions of history from that which
 
could be independently verified through the modern social
 
sciences, especially given the paucity of contemporaneous
 
corroborative sources and the ever increasing importance of
 
archaeological contributions to the study of ancient Judaic
 
culture. With respect to the scriptural literature of each
 
faith, I attempted to use a several translations for
 
semantic reasons. For example, when discussing Tanak (or
 
Old Testament) literature, I relied on both the definitive
 
Masoretic text and,the Peshitta (Aramaic) version. I did
 
this for comparative reasons, the LXX (Septuagint)
 
tra.nslation being excluded for its questionable reliability
 
in the exuGial area of ancient e|3ic po^^^ For Qur'anic
 
citations I relied on Pickthall's translation, although I
 
augmented his work with other selections, including Dawood's
 
(whose work I consider to be inferior) in an attempt to
 
indicate the problems that have plagued Qur'anic studies in
 
the west.
 
Early Christian sources include Tertullian, Ignatius
 
of Antioch, St. Justin Martyr, Hippolytus, St. Vincent of
 
Lerin, Orusius, Sculpius Severus, St. Augustine, Eusebius
 
and Leo the Great. Most of these sources I found translated
 
in edited compilations by Anne Fremantle (A Treasury of
 
Early Christianity).. Edwin A. Quain (The Fathers of the
 
Church), Philip Schaff (The Nicene and Post Nicene Fathers
 
of the Christian Church). or Jean Comby (How to Read Church
 
History). The complete works I cited for early Christianity
 
were Eusebius' History of the Church and St. Augustine^s
 
City of God (upon which I relied extensively). An excellent
 
primary Medieval source, one which illustrates the extent to
 
which Charlemagne was committed to St. Augustine's ideal,
 
can be found in Einhard^s Life of Charlemagne, included in
 
Two Lives of Charlemagne (Lewis Thorpe, translator)., Other
 
primary sources for the Medieval period have been collected
 
and edited by scholars such as Brian Tierney (The Middle
 
Ages. Sources of Medieval History) and Patrick Geary
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(Readings in Medieval Histonyi"; A veritable wealth of holy
 
war rhetoric may be gleaned from the letters of Gregory VII.
 
These have been translated by Ephraim Emerton in a
 
collection entitled The Correspondence of Pope Gregory VII.
 
I found several first hand accounts of the Crusades in the
 
memoirs of Raymond IV (Count of Toulouse) and Geoffrey of
 
Villehardouin to be helpful as background information,
 
although I did not rely upon them for content; a slightly
 
less contemporary account is that of Joinville's.
 
Primary Islamic sources, at least those translations
 
interpretive of jihad, are expressed in the body of Hadith
 
literature bequeathed to the Muslim communities throughout
 
the world. These sources rely almost exclusively on the
 
value of interpretation of ideas and are to be distinguished
 
from historical sources that are more relevant to the
 
process by which holy war became an accepted institutional
 
response in Islam. Hadith is likely to stress the "proper"
 
:interpretation of jihad as a concept of personal struggle
 
against sin and a political struggle for the independence of
 
the Islamic community. Because it is couched in such
 
hyperbole, however, it appears to preach war. For the
 
purposes of this project, I deferred to sources utilizing
 
the definitive interpretations of al-Bukhari. Contemporary
 
Arab accounts of the Crusades, although I did not consider
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them entirely relevant to the specific topic, abound in Amin
 
Maaloufs The Crusades Through Arab Eyes and Francesco
 
Gabrieli's Arab Historians Of the Crusades♦ 
Secondary 
Because the topic of ancient Israelite history is 
dependent on scriptural considerations, it was necessary to 
spend some time evaluating interpretive sources. In this 
regard, I normally deferred to the expertise of established 
Biblical scholarship. I did, on occasion, disagree with the 
consensus on some issues; however, in the body of the paper 
I emphasized whose scholarship I consider authoritative. ; 
The scholarship I consulted included Moshe Weinfeld 
(Deuteronomv and the Deuteronomic School) . Julius Bewer (The 
Literature of the 01d Testament) . Richard Elliott Friedman 
(Who Wrote the Bible?) . James D. Martin (The Book of Judges) 
and Robert Polzin (Moses and the Deuteronomist) . Several 
edited volumes containing the works of J.M. Miller 
("Israelite History") '', Peter Ackroyd ("The Historical 
Literature")^, Keith Whitelam ("The Former Prophets")® and A. 
Graeme Auld ("Prophecy and the Prophets") ' were used 
For the vast majority of the material that became, in 
12 
effect, a structural model in ancient Israelite history for
 
this work, I consulted six texts. Among these, perhaps the
 
most valuable were Paul Johnson's Historv of the Jews, the
 
admirable (if somewhat controversial) archaelogical analysis
 
of William Stiebing's Out of the Desert?. and the concise
 
yet surprisingly complete information obtained from the
 
Dictionary of Bible and Religion, edited by William H,
 
Gentz. A seminal work by Barnabas Lindars entitled Judges
 
1-5, A New Translation and Commentary provided me with the
 
most current research concerning the Deuteronomic authorship
 
of "Judges" and was absolutely central to my contention that
 
holy war themes in Israelite history appeared for the first
 
time in the early monarchic period. Several other works,
 
such as Susan Niditch's War in the Hebrew Bible and T.R.
 
Hobbs' A Time for War; A Study of Warfare in the Old
 
Testament, effectively dealt with the general theme of
 
Judaic warfare. Journal articles on the topic of Judaic
 
holy war that I utilized were: Reuven Firestone's
 
"Conceptions of Holy War in Biblical and Qur'anic Tradition"
 
(Journal of Religious Ethics. Spr.*96, 24:99-123) and
 
Michael Walzer's "The Idea of Holy War in Ancient Israel"
 
(Journal of Religious Ethics. Fall*92, 20:215-235).
 
Given the tendency of western historians to categorize
 
Christian concepts of war within the Augustinian "just war"
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model, I had to re-interpret much of the existing historical
 
literature. I do not think that secularism has been
 
uncritical of Christian warfare; I simply believe that for
 
cultural reasons western warfare has been favorably
 
contrasted to that of the Islamic east. Thus, "just war"
 
has been viewed as a Christian concept,"holy war" as an
 
Islamic feature,® There are, however, exceptions to this
 
rule. Several Scholars, including Runciman and Armstrong.,
 
have effectively challenged this notion (unfortunately, they
 
do not apply an operational definition of holy war in the
 
process). As will be seen, I attempt to prove a
 
definitional model of Christian holy war based on
 
Augustine's works.
 
The most noteworthy attempt to define Christian
 
concepts of war, to date, is that of John Kelsay and James
 
Turner Johnson, who effectively draw appropriate parallels
 
between Christian just war and Islamic holy war and explain
 
their expropriation by modern political ideologies.® This
 
explains their reliance on variant sunni and shi'i
 
traditions involving theories of war; it is essential to a
 
modern understanding of holy war, given the advent of
 
Islamic revival and the impact of the Iranian revolution on
 
extremist movements.^® I, on the other hand, have sought to
 
establish the religious ideological roots from which holy
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war theories emerged, not the modern political ideologies
 
that expropriate thei^ (althou^ I entirely agree with Kelsay
 
and Johnson that religioh and political ideology ate
 
complimentary of one another). Kelsay and Johnson have also
 
worked hard to establish a Christian theoretical model of
 
just war In this regard, however, I believe that Augustine ;
 
articulated two separate and distinct theories of war: the
 
just war and the holy war." Established texts of Medieval
 
ecclesiastical history include Henry Chadwick's The Earlv
 
Church. Thomas Bokenkotter's A Concise History of the
 
Catholic Church. Arnold Harris Matthew's The Life and Times
 
of Hildebrand and a multi-volumed work entitled The History
 
of the Christian Church, edited by Anselm Biggs.
 
Because the idea of holy war as an ideology became the
 
primary focus for this thesis project, the particulars of
 
crusading warfare were of little interest. What mattered
 
was the agenda of the theocratic leaders of the Crusades,
 
i.e., kings and popes. Histories tracing the evolution of
 
the crusading ideal were of particular importance in this
 
regard. Aside from consulting Runciman, whose multi-volumed
 
work represents the authoritative text on the Crusades, I
 
also utilized Jonathan Riley-Smith's The First Crusade and
 
the Idea of Crusading. Carl Erdman^s The Origin of the Idea
 
of Crusade and Ronald C.vFinucane's Soldiers of the Faith.
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Upon undertaking the necessary research for the chapter
 
on Isiaiti/: I was cognizant of the fact that Very few, if any,
 
western sources have treated the Islamic concept of jihad
 
with the objectivity it deserves. Works such as Dilip
 
Hiro's Holy Wars. The Rise of Islamic Fundamentalism, and
 
ri.H. Hansen^s Militant Islam, although they provided some
 
valuable basic history, tended to perpetuate the western
 
stereotype of Islam as a militant faith. Other sources,
 
such as Hazrat Mizra Tahir Ahmad's Murder in the Name of
 
Allah provided balance, however, and articulated the notion
 
that, among the three monotheistic traditions, theoretical
 
Islam imposed a greater number of restrictions on the
 
ability to wage war than either Judaism or Christianity.
 
The research of Ralph Salmi, Cesar Adib, and George K. ;
 
Tanham (Islam and Conf1let Resolution, Theories and
 
Practices) Served as valuable background information.
 
Seminal research into the period of early Islamic
 
conquest has been conducted by John W. Jandora (The March
 
From Medina: A Revisionist Study of the Arab Conquests) and
 
Fred McGraw Donner (The Early Islamic Conquests). for . : . ; ,
 
purposes of this paper, I relied on Donner's work. For
 
Qur'anic exegesis and interpretation, I consulted John '
 
Burton^s The Collection of the Durban, Kenneth Craaa^s The
 
Event of the Our^an. and Helmut Gatje's The Our^an and its
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 Exegesis. I utilized the historical inforniation con
 
in al-Tabari's histories, translated by Philip Fields, the
 
excellent work of Elias Shoufani (Al-Riddah and the Muslim
 
Conquest of Arabia), The Cambridge History of Islam edited
 
by Holt, Lambton and Lewis, R. Stephen Humphreys^ Islamic
 
History: A Framework for Inquiry. Sydney Nettleton^M
 
and i11iaiti Oschenwaldts The Middle East: A. History. Albert
 
Hoiirani^s A History of the Arab Peoples, Arthur
 
Goldschmidt's A Concise History of the Middle East, M. Fuad
 
Korpulu's The origins of the Ottoman Empire, and Ira
 
Lapidus' A History of Islamic Societies. I relied upon
 
these historical texts extensively.
 
: Utilizing these sources, it was possible to adequately 
investigate the sources of holy war theory in monotheistic 
tradition. It • does;seem interesting that religious ideology 
operates so well within the framework of a monotheistic 
culture. Perhaps this is due to the fact that central 
theocratic governments,are enhanced by development of the 
notion that one god, supreme and all-powerful,■rules the 
physical environment of humanity. To be sure, the ancient 
Egyptians had advanced the idea that their rulers were semi-, 
divine within the context of a polytheistic society. ■; In 
fact, it would be difficult not to regard theirs as a • 
theocratic state. The sheer multiplicity of gods, however. 
17 
made it tiaxd to mandate a national will as local dieties
 
were arguably symbolic representatives of various Egyptian
 
sub-regions and their particular political agendas. Until
 
Akhenaten's attempt to unify the two kingdoms under one god,
 
there had been no effort to exercise the influence of one
 
constituency over the other in ancient Egypt. Once the
 
ascendancy of a particular constituency was achieved, a
 
single, directed effort at creating a "national" unity
 
became possible. Despite the polytheism of Mesopotamia,
 
various sky gods achieved dominance in Sumerian, Akkadian,
 
Assyrian, and Babylonian pantheons, each exercising a
 
particular influence on their respective communities' will
 
to wage war. The success of these "dominant gods" and their
 
intimate relationship to the state and its leaders served as
 
a model for ancient Middle-Eastern societies in pursuit of
 
cultural and political cohesion. In the region of Canaan, a
 
small ethnic community, centered on the growing influence of
 
one of these militant gods, effectively united the concepts
 
of divine will and nationhood and defined (perhaps for the
 
first time) the relevancy of holy war.
 
While Western historians have adequately explained the
 
rational expropriation of religious themes for purposes of
 
war in ancient polytheistic societies, they remain obstinant
 
in their unwillingness to discuss the same process occurring
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in the monotheistic tradition. Monotheism has seemingly
 
cornered the market on fanaticism. It is the purpose of
 
this thesis project to address this misunderstanding.
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CHAPTER ONE: JUDAIC NATIONALISM
 
The eventual success of YHWH in achieving singular
 
devotion among the Israelite tribes developed slowly and
 
methodically. At first, the ancient Jews entertained a
 
pantheon of gods similar to that of various Semitic peoples^
 
inhabiting the Arabian, Mesopotamian, and Canaanite regions.;
 
Gradually, the notion that one God held sway over all
 
creation cook hold and flourished in the nomadic environment
 
of early Israelite culture. In a similar fashion, both
 
Judaic history and Jewish religious ideology developed over
 
time. This chapter will critically analyze the sources of
 
Judaic history in an attempt to piece together the process
 
by which holy war gained political, social, and scriptural
 
approval. It will be demonstrated that religious ideology
 
emerged during specific periods of social and political
 
crisis in the Israelite community, most notably in the
 
monarchic period, occasionally re-emerging as an effective
 
tool of political opposition in the world of Hellenistic
 
imperialism. Crucial to this task is the subjection of
 
Biblical sources to the rigors of textual analysis.
 
Western scholarship has inherited a rich and venerable
 
tradition of textual analysis and criticism from the
 
humanists of the Renaissance period. Since Lorenzo Valla's
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exposure of Constantine's "Donatio" as a forgery, efforts
 
have been made to regard religious and ecclesiastical
 
literature with some measure of objectivity Even the Bible
 
has come to be seen as a historical source of arguable ;
 
integrity; reliant, to a certain extent, on whatever
 
corroboration may be achieved through the application of
 
modern social sciences.
 
That is not to say that Biblical historicism is not
 
without its defenders; indeed, in recent years there has
 
emerged a "revival" of scriptural literalism that has helped
 
to invigorate the Christian apologetic movement. Still, if
 
the Bible's champions demand that it be treated as serious,
 
history, then it should be subjected to all the tests that a
 
true historical document requires. Surprisingly, there are
 
those who still attempt to date the exodus based upon the
 
eruption of Thera, simply because this catastrophic event
 
helps to explain the parting of the Red Sea; an event we
 
accept as history only because the Bible mentions it.
 
Scholarship, however, demands more than a faithful
 
acceptance of time-honored geneologies and mythic events in
 
order to render a reasonable verdict concerning the accuracy
 
of the historical record contained in the Bible. With a
 
prudent and discriminating use of external sources and
 
internal textual analysis, however, one may reliably piece
 
 together the essential elements of ancient Judaic history.
 
For the present moment, it will be sufficient to
 
compare what we know about the ancient Judaic period from
 
Biblical sources with the contemporary historical record and
 
the discoveries made available through the archaeological
 
sciences. The Bible indicates twelve main periods preceding
 
the Diaspora that are relevant to my research:
 
(1) The Patriarchal Age
 
(2) Slavery (in Egypt)
 
(3) Exodus
 
(4) Conquest of Canaan
 
(5) Judges (Confederation of Tribes)
 
(6) Monarchy
 
(A) United
 
(B) Divided
 
(7) Earlier Prophets
 
(8) Assyrian Conquest
 
(9) Babyloniau Exile
 
(10) Return to Palestine
 
(11) Seleucid Domination
 
(12) Roman Occupation
 
This outline serves as both an aid and a critical tool with
 
which to compare the information extrapolated by historians
 
and textual critics concerning the socio-political
 
environments of the ancient Judaic state with the stated
 
Biblical interpretation of history. In the attempt to
 
reconstruct (Fudaic history and the scriptural acceptance of
 
a holy war ideology, it seems reasonable to begin with the
 
conquest of Canaan.
 
■ .22 ' ' 
Gonquest of Canaan {1258'-122d B.C.E.)
 
The discussion of events surrounding the supposed
 
conquest of Gannan by the Israelites is crucial, for it was
 
precisely during this period that Moses was credited with
 
perhaps the first expressipn of the Judaic holy war ethic in
 
Biblical tradition.'^- If the conquest narratives cannot be
 
trusted as historical, however, it is clear that the idea of
 
Judaic holy war must be re-assigned to a later period in
 
Judaic history. ; ;
 
According to the Biblical account, the Israelites
 
wandered for forty years in the wilderness surrounding the
 
area of Kadesh-Barnea, before entering Canaan (Num.20:14).
 
From there they launched an invasion of Canaanite territory,
 
that traversed the regions of the Negeb and either skirted
 
or passed through Edom, in an attempt to conquer the cities
 
of the north. Specific mention is made of locations such
 
as Beer-sheba and Hormah, in the Negeb, as urban centers
 
contemporaneous with this invasion by the Bible. The
 
kingdoms and/or cities of Trans-Jordan listed are: Moab,
 
Edom, Punon, Oboth, Dibon, Jericho and Ai
 
There are immediate problems in ascribing historical
 
accuracy to the conquest narratives of the Old Testament.
 
According the "terminus ante quem" provided to us by the
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Merneptah stele, the Israelite exodus may be dated to the
 
period preceding the reign of its author (1224-1214
 
B.C.E.),^"' Biblical geneologies, used by literalists as a
 
dating method for the exodus, are absolutely unreliable
 
given the exaggerated life spans of the central characters.
 
Thus, we are left with the compelling evidence of Ex.1:11
 
(corroborated with archaeological data) that places the
 
Israelite captivity within the reign of Ramses II, just
 
before that of Merneptah.^® Recent attempts to redate the
 
exodus to the fifteenth century B.C.E. have been largely
 
unsuccessful." We can be reasonably assured, therefore,
 
that if the exodus occurred at all, it took place some time
 
'in the thirteenth century B.C.E. According to traditional
 
dating methods, this means that any invasion of Canaanite
 
lands must have occurred during the Late Bronze Age (1500­
1200 B.C.E). Unfortunately, the archaeological record
 
confirms nothing of the sort.
 
Interestingly, the absence of identifiable artifacts
 
indicates that there were no Late Bronze Age settlements,
 
either in the Negeb, corresponding to the supposed locations
 
of Beer-sheba and Hormah, or in Trans-Jordan, in the areas
 
of Hesbon, Aroer, Punon, Oboth, Dibon, Jericho or Ai.^°
 
This problem has led some to question the archaeological
 
dating system that places the end of the Middle Bronze Age
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shortly before the fifteenth century B.C.E.
 
Correspondingly, such critics as John Bimson theorize that
 
this allows for a iauch earlier exodus, which would
 
potentially explain the absence of Late Bronze Age artifacts
 
at specific locations traditionally associated with the
 
conquest In actuality/ Bimson's theory poses more
 
problems than it pretends to solve. For one thing, it
 
places the period of conquest and Hebrew Judges concurrent
 
with a well documented Egyptian presence in Canaan. The
 
fourteenth century Amarna tablets' reference to "Hapiru"
 
insurrections are only tenuously connected to the Israelite
 
community, due to the probability that the term was
 
descriptive of social status rather than ethnicity.
 
Seemingly, we are presented with a historical paradox: a
 
thirteenth century invasion of Cahaan for which there is no
 
corroborative archaeological eyldence. This problem has
 
resulted in a number of attempts to construct alternative
 
"models" for the Israelite occupation of Cahaan. Among
 
these are the: (1)Settlement and (2)Internal-Revolt
 
hypotheses. The Internal-Revolt model depends almost
 
exclusively on social theory and has been regarded as
 
suspect. For purposes of this thesis project, the
 
Settlement model was used, because it allows for some
 
moderation. Regardless of the method of occupation, it is
 
25
 
clear, the Israelites settled in Canaan. A reasonable
 
assumption, given the absence of evidence for wholesale
 
destruction, is that they probably migrated there in small
 
numbers some time in the thirteenth century B,C.E. Despite
 
this, the fact remains that if the Biblical record cannot be
 
trusted as a reliable historical source, then we may assume
 
that the "conquest" of Canaan represents nothing less than
 
an invention of later authors intended as an explanation of
 
the Israelite presence there. The holy war themes expressed
 
in conquest stories, therefore, may also be seen as
 
subsequent additions. There is concrete evidence that they
 
were inserted into the books of Joshua and Judges by an
 
author of the monarchic period.
 
The Period of Judges (1200-1000 B.C.E.)
 
The evidence suggests that by the twelfth and eleventh
 
centuries B.C.E. an Israelite community existed within the
 
territorial boundaries of Canaan. During this period, a
 
loose confederation of tribes ruled by charismatic "judges",
 
or military chieftans, fought occasional battles with the
 
surrounding ethnic groups indegenous to the region. In no
 
sense could this confederation have been construed as a
 
mechanism for a unified response to the external crises of
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: the periqdV^®( ■ fact, that the tribes under ; 
f the Authority of the judgee^^^r^ only defensively to the­
^ various threats to Israelite security, and not aggressively 
as some have thought.^® 
It was at this time, the scholarly consensus maintains, 
that the oldest Judaic war hymn, the"Song of Deborah", was 
'	composed This poem;exemplifies the very es of
 
ancient Israelite holy war mentality. The practice of
 
consulting with God before battle is clearly demonstrated in
 
the actions of Deborah, and the language of Judges 6:13 and
 
6:31 hints of God's endorsement of war If these themes
 
are accurate indications of Israelite culture in the : 
confederacy period, then, it must be surmised, a holy war 
mentality preceded the monarchy by at least two hundred 
years.\ ^ ■ ''./'.'l'"'N ' '> 
There are problems, however, with the credibility of
 
the consensus on this issue. Many of the scholars who
 
, :champion the antiquity and accuracy of this poem actually
 
, take a literalist approach in their methodology. A
 
■ considerable lack of attention is paid to the historical 
./ consensus, in this regard. For example, there is
 
considerable evidence that the practice of divine
 
consultation before battle was an ancient and venerable
 
Middle-Eastern tradition designed to invoke God's
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protection, not his approval, in war.^® This practice had
 
arguably become a ritual observance devoid of any profound
 
significance for the Israelite community. Recent research
 
has tended to throw doubt on the supposed antiquity of the
 
poem in question, as well. It would not be an overstatement
 
to conclude that the "unanimous" consensus on the issue has
 
been effectively shattered. A comprehensive study of
 
"Deborah's Song" was completed in 1995 by Barnabas Lindars.
 
This seminal work represents the current scholarly research
 
concerning the pre-monarchic period of Judaic literature and
 
may form the basis for a new consensus. Lindars'
 
position, based on an almost line-by-line assessment of
 
"Deborah's Song", is that the poem was probably composed
 
sometime during the early monarchy and is singularly out of
 
place in the period of judges.
 
The Monarchic Period (1020-597 B.C.E.)
 
In discussing the Israelite monarchy, one must be
 
cognizant of the various stages through which it passed.
 
For example, upon examining the early monarchy, a serious
 
scholar should not expect to find mature, fully formed
 
expressions of the holy war ethic. Instead, scholarly
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analysis jiiight detect indieations of an emerging agenda ttat
 
necessitated such expressions. Realistically, it would be
 
naive to classify the early period as part of the united
 
monarchy at all, given the hesitancy with which many sectors
 
of the Israelite community surrendered autonomy. Only after
 
the considerable military successes of David could it be
 
truly said that the Israelite kingdom was, in any sense,
 
united geographically.
 
If we are to impute some credibilty to the research of
 
Lindars (and others who comprise the new consensus), then it
 
would be reasonable to expect that holy war themes like
 
those expressed in the book of Judges were the product of a
 
later author, Arguably, this author operated sometime in
 
the monarchic period. As will be demonstrated, oral
 
history, Yahwistic, Elohistic, and Deuteronomic literary
 
composition converged in the monarchic period to produce a
 
:Judaic model for holy war. The periods assigned to each of
 
these literary•traditions are as follows: early monarchy
 
(oral histories), united monarchy (Yahwistic sources) and
 
divided monarchy (Elohistic and Deuteronomic sources). It
 
would be the task of the Deuteronomic historian(s) to .
 
essentially reconstruct Judaic history in the books of
 
Deuteronomy, ,Joshua, Judges, 1 and II Kings, I and II :
 
Chronicles, and Samuel.
 
29
 
As previously noted/ the reign of Saul can be placed in
 
the period of the early mdnarchy, even though he did
 
nominally rule over a unified kingdom. Until David's
 
successful Campaign against the Philistines/ the Israelite
 
kingdom would remain geographically small. David's ;
 
reign(lOdd-961 B.C.E.) does/ in fact, straddle the periods:
 
of early and united monarchy; and although:he began the
 
trend of centralization typical of the united monarchy, the
 
period of true unification belongs to Solomon's reign (961­
922 B.C.E.)/ when state-implemented policies and the
 
nationalistic ideology of religion complimented each other.
 
That is not to say that the task of creating a unified
 
ideology was completed under Solomon; in fact, precisely
 
because there were no external crises during this period,
 
the issue remained relatively dormant. It would not be
 
until the catastrophic Assyrian invasions of the seventh
 
century B.C.E. that the dire necessity for a nationalism
 
would emerge, producing the work of the Deuteronomic school
 
of history (it was during the reign of Josiah that a
 
fragment of the Deuteronomic law code was "discovered" in
 
the Jerusalem temple)
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The Early Monarchy {1020-1000 B.CiE.)
 
The initial causes that produced the institution of the
 
monarchy and resulted, almost four hundred years later, in
 
the extreme nationalism of Josiah's reign could be found at
 
the end of the period of judges. The confederation found it
 
increasingly difficult to survive the highly competitive
 
environment of the ancient Middle-East as the Israelite
 
tribes had many adversaries with which to contend for
 
resources.-^ A decisive moment had arrived in Israelite
 
history.'The need for a strong, unified government that
 
could foster and protect a cultural identity, and thereby
 
insure the survival of the Israelite community, now worked
 
to produce the institution of the monarchy. In addition,
 
this monarchy would marry the secular perogatives of
 
military defense and economic policy with the unique
 
attributes of religious authority. In short, Israel
 
developed as a theocracy.
 
Initially, this fledgling monarchy suffered under the
 
inconsistent leadership of Saul, who fought tirelessly
 
against the external threats to Israel but offended the
 
general population with his volatile personality.^' The
 
Israelites had been hesitant to hand over such authority to
 
a single individual; the very notion seemed to violate their
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sense of independence and autonomy. This wariness of
 
central authority was typical of the prophetic community.
 
The prophets, who had wielded considerable charismatic power
 
in the early Israelite communities, feared an erosion of
 
their power base, once the king was appointed. The popular
 
cry for political cohesion was too insistent, however, and
 
the prophet Samuel relented, placing Saul on the throne of
 
Israel. Although he blessed the new king, Samuel performed
 
the ritual with a warning:
 
"This will be the manner of the king
 
that shall,reign over you: he will
 
take your sons and appoint them unto
 
him...and he will take your daughters
 
to be performers and to be cooks and
 
to be bakers. And he will take your
 
fields, and your vineyards, and your
 
olive yards, even the best of them
 
to his servants...He will take a tenth
 
of your flocks and ye shall be his
 
servants.
 
These words were especially meaningful to the tribal leaders
 
who, for their own reasons, resented any circumvention of
 
their independent political status. As the power of this
 
monarchy grew, eclipsing the influence of both prophet and
 
patriarch, so did rural opposition to the policies of
 
centralized government.®® The task facing the monarchy was
 
to effectively counter these rural concerns with an appeal
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to a greater concept: namely, the notion of Israel as a
 
nation under the protection of Yahweh. It is no accident of
 
history that in the subsequent environment of the united
 
monarchy the "Song of Deborah", with its nationalistic
 
themes, was most probably composed.
 
As the need for political centralization and
 
militarization increased, there emerged a genre of
 
propaganda that expropriated traditional devices (Judaic
 
verse) in an attempt to construct a national polity, based
 
on the unitive properties of religious culture. At first, :
 
it comprised only an awkward attempt to place nationalistic
 
motifs in the chaotic years of confederacy. As the
 
integrity of this propaganda developed, Yahweh became the
 
symbol of divine leadership and would be increasingly
 
perceived as the agent who shared His salvific properties
 
with the King. It was, arguably, in the time of David's ;
 
reign (certainly by the end of Solomon's) that another
 
nationalistic poem, "The Song of the Sea" would find its way
 
into the Israelite vocabulary. "The Song of the Sea" was a
 
significant piece of Judaic verse, most notably for its
 
reference (the first one of its kind in history) to Yahweh
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as a God of war, who protected and nurtured the Israelite
 
community.^" Although Biblical "purists" argue that ample
 
evidence exists elsewhere in scripture for a God of
 
retribution, it becomes essential to deteremine when these
 
specific elements of Scripture were developed, either
 
verbally or in their final written form.
 
Biblical narrative is largely the product of four
 
interwoven sources: The J (Yahwist,10-9th centuries B.C.E.),
 
■ . E (Elohist,9-8th centuries B.C.E.), D (Deuteronomist,8-7th 
centuries B.C.E.), and P (Priestly,6th century B.C.E.) 
schools of literary tradition.'" The Bible, therefore, 
cannot be read as a chronological document due to the 
y	 ideological and social agendas that obtained at the various
 
times of composition, requiring the creation of history (as
 
oral verse and written prose) long after the events it
 
describes occurred. Thus, although the Exodus most probably
 
took place in the thirteenth century B.C and was rendered
 
verbally into the collective Israelite consciousness, it was
 
not until the tenth and ninth centuries that specific
 
■	 elements of that story, contained in such poems as "The Song 
of the Sea", were recorded in written form by the Yahwist 
source." Additionally, much of scripture did not appear in 
,its final written form unti1 after the influence of the
 
; Priestly source who, operating, in exilic times, edited and
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 redacted the poems, folk-tales; and fragmentary accounts
 
that eventually comprised the Pentateuch.
 
The initial task of the scriptural scholar, then, is to
 
determine which books of the Bible were more heavily
 
influenced by one school or another, and when they were
 
written. The following table depicts the current consensus
 
concerning Biblical authorship relevant to this thesis
 
project''^:
 
Genesis J, E, p 
Exodus J, E, D, P 
Leviticus : Pv' ' 
Numbers
 
Deuteronomy E, D
 
Joshua D
 
■ D ■Judges
 
I Samuel ■, D ■ 
II Samuel D 
Note the prominence of the Deuteronomic historian in the 
creation of early texts, particularly those whose subject 
matter pertains to the conquest narratives (Deuteronomy, 
Joshua, Judges and I and II Samuel) . The socio-political 
agenda of this Deuteronomic historian(s) will be 
subsequently discussed at length in an analysis of the 
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divided monarchy.
 
The table also helps to illustrate that the J, or
 
Yahwist/ literary tradition was instrumental in the early
 
construction of exodus texts, at precisely the same time
 
that nationalistic poems such as "The Song of Deborah" and
 
"The Song of the Sea" (in their pristine oral renditions)
 
were emerging as monarchical propaganda for centralization.
 
This represents nothing less than "polemic history", in
 
which the alienation of indigenous cultures was achieved
 
through the sanction of holy war. In their scholarly
 
analysis of the Yahwist source, David Rosenberg and Harold
 
Bloom have observed that the self-defined "jealousy" of the
 
Israelite God reflects, in essence, the "zeal ofthe divine
 
warrior."''^ Additionally, Rosenberg and Bloom have found
 
that the exodus represented, for the Yahwist author, not a
 
liberation from bondage so much as the beginning of a "new
 
exile" (forty years of wandering and the uncertainty of the
 
confederation period). The Yahwist author, then, probably
 
regarded the establishment of an Israelite kingdom as a type
 
of political and social renewal for the community. In this
 
context, even the prohibition of images was an expression of
 
Yahweh's "dynamism", a dimension that contributed to the
 
Davidic notion that "everything that matters is perpetually
 
new."^® The two nationalistic poems of the period were
 
expressions of this renewal in which a new nationalism,
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centered on faith in Yahweh and his representative the King,
 
was emerging. This process would come to fruition during
 
the reign of Solomon, when the Yahwist author refined and
 
institutionalized the concept of theocracy in scripture.^''
 
The United Monarchy (1000-922 B.C.E.)
 
- What did this "renewal" of Israelite culture entail? •
 
For one thing, it'resulted in the establishment of political
 
and religious authority in Jerusalem. The relocation of the
 
Ark of the Covenant there by David set the stage for
 
portentious political and religious reforms that would .
 
further sabotage the autonomy of rural constituencies.
 
Significantly, it was David who finally subdued the V;
 
Philistine armies, utilizing, no doubt, the impressive
 
"warrior zeal" the Yahwist author had toiled so tirelessly
 
to produce. Given the reasons for centralization, the
 
emphasis on "renewal" in this period, and the developing
 
progandastic tools utilized to pursue nationalistic goals, a
 
national ideology now began to emerge. In this regard, the
 
"blessings of Yahweh" on the nation entailed nothing less
 
than Ellul's "predetermined ends" of government: political
 
stability, economic prosperity, and territorial integrity.
 
■ As the military stature of Israel improved, political 
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and religious reforms were pursued vigordusly. Under
 
Solomon, the institution of the monarchy became synonimous
 
with religious authority and the temple in Jerusalem emerged
 
as the effective royal, dynastic chapel of the the King.^®
 
The course pursued by Solomon provoked considerable 
opposition to his policies, expectedly from those 
traditional pockets Of disaffected constituencies that 
continued to suffer from diminished status: tribal 
leadership and the prophetic schools♦ Although prophetic 
opposition to state policies dared not raise its voice too 
loudly in the Solomonic period, an anti-monarchic sentiment, 
born of dissatisfaction with the corvee began to emerge^ 
This political feeling would express itself in subsequent 
movements as a loyal Yahwistic critique of royal 
"orientalism" .1'° Just as the pro-monarchic Yahwistic 
authors of scriptural tradition were helping to create a 
religious propaganda for the state, prophetic social 
movements were beginning to incorporate holy war motifs into 
their own agendas. It was the specific intent of the 
Yahwistic author, who reinterpreted the period of exodus and 
conquest in nationalistic vand theocratic terms, to de­
legitimize the opposition both with "historical" proofs and 
theological statements based,on Scripture. 
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The Piyided Monarchy (922-597 B.C.E.)
 
When the sbcial tensions of unification became too much
 
for the disparate tribes to bear, the kingdom ruptured in
 
922 B..C.E, ieaving Jeroboam in the north to rule over the
 
larger -kingdom of;Israel and Rehoboam ih the south to
 
administer Jud^h, Throughout the period of divided
 
monarchy, the northern and southern kingdoms continued the
 
process of centralization but.with varying reactions from
 
their respective opposition movements.
 
In a way, the northern kingdom contained the seeds of
 
its own,destruction. It had been the northern rural tribes,
 
suffering under the yoke of forced labor in the south/ that
 
had rebelled against Jerusalem. The most virulent anti-

government forces, then, were concentrated in the kingdom of
 
Israel. In an attempt to subvert any invasion plans from
 
the south, however, Israel embarked on the same /
 
centralization policies that had proven to be the downfall
 
of the unified kingdom. Within fifty years of its
 
inception, the Israelite kingdom, led by the powerful Omri
 
dynasty, located its religious and political authority in
 
the urban centers of Bethel and Samaria. This resulted in
 
a great chasm between the cities and the rural poor that
 
might have provoked tribal opposition were it not for the
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state's acGomociation of local cultic traditions and
 
practices. To a certain extent, the royal patronage of
 
indigenous Baal cults and the erection of the golden calf at
 
Bethel mollified local opposition to royal policies.
 
Unfortunately, these attempts at synchrotism only angered
 
the prophetic community, which now positioned itself as
 
God's scourge on the monarchy.
 
Increasingly, the prophets of Israel had witnessed the
 
erosion of their political and moral authority in society.
 
Now, they could only.watch as in the north they were
 
replaced with "court prophets", who were nothing more than
 
royal sycophants Such men comforted the apostate Ahab in
 
his campaigns against Ben-Hadad (Kings 20:13).-^ This
 
obvious circumvention of proper authority,offended the sense
 
of moral conscience and orthodoxy of the prophets. In the
 
north,'their outrage would vent itself in aggressive, anti­
moharchical: outbursts tinged with the moral imperatives of
 
holy war.'^"^ '
 
In Judah, to the south, criticism was much less harsh,
 
partly because the most violent opposition to monarchy had
 
always been in the north, but also, because the southern
 
kingdom was much smaller and the burden of administration
 
was less severe.^'' Additionally, Judaean Kings like
 
Jehosopbat (873-840 B.C.E.)/ rather than capitulate to local
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politics by assimilating indigenous Canaanite culture, chose
 
to utilize the religious community of Jerusalem to enforce
 
cultural unity throughout the rural areas of Judah.^® This
 
did not always work, however, and occasionally the need
 
arose to repair the damage done by someone like Athalia
 
(Ahab's sister), who had attempted to "Canaanize" Judah.^^
 
Interestingly, the first of the great southern prophets,
 
Isaiah, began chastizing King Uzziah for his apostasy
 
directly after the destructive influence of Athaliah's
 
reign. Still, the southern prophets always ended their
 
discourses with messianic references, promising the future
 
glory of Judah under the restoration of the Davidic line.^®
 
This stood apart from the gloomy themes expressed by critics
 
of the northern kingdom, as. exemplified in the discourses of
 
Amos and Hosea. Perhaps sensing the tenuous existence of
 
Israel, which found itself assailed by prophets and menaced
 
by emerging Aramaean and Assyrian hegemony, the Elohist
 
author emerged. The Elohist attempted, in ways startlingly
 
similar to the Yahwist of the United Monarchy, to craft a
 
northern nationalism.^® Although it ultimately failed in
 
convincing the north to unite, the Elohistic literature
 
would become another of the great "schools" on which later
 
scripture based its authority.
 
Sufficient diversity among the Judaean tribes, coupled
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with the mild, yet persistent, prophetic criticism of Isaiah
 
and the heterodoxy of the north, produced a need for a
 
southern rearticulation of the Yahwistic nationalism so
 
recently abandonded. Indeed, the climate had become almost
 
desperate after the fall of Israel to the armies of Assyria
 
in 720 B.C.E., a blow that shook the Judaean kingdom to its
 
very core.®° The combined forces of state and religious
 
authority, in the south, had to somehow reproduce a sense of
 
cultural identity and military resolve unequaled since the
 
era of David and Solomon. The united monarchy had
 
successfully created Israel's Warrior-God, now the Judaean
 
kingdom had to resurrect him in an effort to convince the
 
people to fight unceasingly and unmercifully against the
 
powerful forces amassing outside the Judaean borders.
 
As fortune would have it, the timely "discovery" of the
 
Deuteronomic Law occurred at precisely this juncture in
 
Judaic history, providing the Judaean king Josiah (622
 
B.C.E.) with the framework from which a new theocratic
 
nationalism could be constructed.®' The chapters of
 
Deuteronomy included in this fragment, among other things,
 
expounded upon the events surrounding the Joshuan campaign
 
in Canaan immediately following the migration of Israelite
 
tribes from Egypt in the thirteenth century B.C.E. Given
 
the lack of archaeological evidence to support the existence
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of this campaign, it can be surmised that the Deuteronomic
 
author responsdble for the Temple Scroll created this story
 
for reasons comprehensible only to the intended audience of
 
his day. What was the underlying political and social
 
environment that determined the views of that audience,
 
then?
 
In 622 B.C.E., during the reign of Josiah, the southern
 
kingdom still reeled from the paralyzing shock of the eighth
 
century Assyrian invasion of Israel. The northern kingdom
 
withered under this fierce assault, and its people's
 
political and religious institutions were subsequently
 
assimilated into Assyrian and Aramaic culture.®^ Ominous
 
signs in the east indicated the growing power of Babylon; at
 
best. Survival for the tiny Judaean kingdom seemed tenuous.
 
The example of northern absorption into Aramaic culture must
 
have convinced the Deuteronomist of the absolute necessity
 
for unity and unquestioning loyalty and sacrifice. It was
 
no time for scruples in the conduct of war; the situation
 
called for ruthless defense of the nation, lest the fate of
 
the north (the annihilation of Judaic culture) should befall
 
the south.
 
Interestingly, when one really examines the holy war
 
exhortations traditionally associated with the discourses of
 
Moses in Deuteronomy, there appears to be a considerable
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emphasis placed on the uniqueness of Judaic culture and the
 
danger of its possible "contamihation" by Canaanite
 
influences. The; charismatic liberator of Israel Was ;V
 
portrayed as having urged the Tstaelitea/. when engaging
 
Hittites, Amorites, Canaanites, Perizzites; Hivites or
 
Jebusites in battle to:
 
"...save alive nothing that breatheth,
 
that they teach you not to do after all
 
their abominations, which they have done
 
unto their gods." [Italics
 
This reference to alien culture is strangely out of context
 
in an environment of diverse Israelite interests, especially
 
given the autonomy of the tribal unit. Simply put, a
 
unified Israelite culture did not exist in the post-exodus
 
period of migration; therefore, it could hardly have been in
 
imminent danger of corruption. The cultural environment of
 
the Judaean kingdom in 622 B.C.E., however, inherited the
 
themes of unification and nationhood so adequately crafted
 
by the early monarchical and Yahwistic authors, despite the
 
stresses they had endured after the fragmentation of the
 
kingdom. The words of Moses, and many of the "historical"
 
figures contained in the books of Joshua, Judges, I Samuel
 
and I and II Kings, arguably belong to Judaic society as;it
 
existed in Josiah's reign and reflected the influence of a
 
new author, the Deuteronom.ist, and his political agenda. .
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This agenda included the insertion of holy war themes in
 
conquest narratives that possessed great propagandistic
 
value in the effort to invent a contemporary nationalism.
 
There is currently a lively discusssion among scholars
 
with regards to determining the period in which the
 
Deuteronomic Historian actually exerted his influence on the
 
scriptural literature of his day. Martin Noth has concluded
 
that the entire Deuteronomic History must be the work of a
 
single individual, operating in post-exilic Palestine.®®
 
Cross and Nelson, however, are of the mind that an original
 
body of Deuteronomic writings were completed in the Josian
 
kingdom and redacted, or edited, during the Babylonian
 
exile. It seems, given the connection to its discovery in
 
the Temple, that this latter view concerning Deuteronomy is
 
the more reasonable assertion.®® Despite disagreement upon
 
the exact date of composition, it is clear that the speeches
 
of Deuteronomical characters are orations, at variance with
 
other historical sources, and intended to sway the audience
 
of a later period.®® In this way, the period of confederacy
 
portrayed in the Deuteronomic Book of Judges was transformed
 
into a mythic era of unification and nationalistic resolve
 
more typical of the Monarchic period to come.®®
 
Although the theocratic nationalism that placed the
 
appropriate political and religious capitol in Jerusalem was
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overthrown in 597 B.C.E. by the Babylonian invasion of
 
Judah, the stature of the Deuteronomist's work was assured.
 
v.- ■ 
The official orthodoxy concerning Judaic prescriptions for
 
holy war and the future revival of the Jerusalem monarchy
 
(as exemplified in messianic litrature) was firmly
 
established in the contributions of the Deuteronomic
 
author. What made the ideas of the Deuteronomist "holy",
 
especially those defining the Judaic concept of war, was
 
their association with the "social values and ideology of
 
the Israelite monarchy."''^ The problem of anti-monarchic
 
sentiment was effectively dealt with through the creation of
 
myths that portrayed the positive contributions of
 
"historical" figures (in spite of their character flaws)
 
In this way, even the negative influence of Solomon could be
 
construed as harmonious with general messianic and
 
nationalistic themes.
 
The reforms undertaken by Josiah in 622 B.C.E.,
 
although they stressed the themes that would become future
 
orthodoxy, were entirely too superficial to be of any use to
 
the Judaean kingdom of the seventh century. In an attempt
 
to create cultural unity, the misguided king plunged his
 
nation headlong into a bloodbath. Heretic priests and
 
native Canaanite rel•igious figures were massacred as Josiah
 
became obsessed with the unification of society under the
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powerful influence cpf Israelite nationalism. The
 
ineffectiveness of Josian reforms influenced the prophet
 
Isaiah who saw the danger to Judaic culture in spiritual and
 
ethical terms. Thus, the efforts of Josiah were received
 
with some trepidation by the nation and lacked the vitality
 
to unite the kingdom in the face of Babylonian aggression.
 
Jerusalem would fall to the conquering armies in 597
 
B.C.E. ^
 
In retrospect. the holy war themes that emerged during
 
the Period of Monarchy represented only a theoretical model
 
for Judaic warfare, in that they were never provided with
 
the opportunity for full implementation."^® The conquest of
 
Canaan was a mythic event, invented for the purposes of
 
later monarchic propaganda. David's exploits did utilize
 
the crude theocratic nationalism of the day but the model of
 
the Joshuan campaigns had not been invented yet and by the
 
time Josiah reigned in Jerusalem it was too late to stem the
 
tide of Babylonian hegemony. The Period of Exile was spent
 
largely reinterpreting the failures of the past and
 
integrating prophetic themes into scripture. In this way,
 
the Priestly Authors explained that had God withdrawn his
 
protection of Israel, in response to heresy and neglect of
 
his worship.
 
As the Assyrian Empire came under the domination of
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the Persiahs, the desire for Israelite repatriation
 
increased. In 538 B.C.E., the Israelites were given
 
permission to return to their lands; an event which
 
influenced the Priestly Authors to "rewrite" parts of the
 
Deuteronomic History in I and II Chronicles. This was
 
accomplished for the purpose of providing a political model
 
for the re-establishment of a Davidic kingdom in
 
Jerusalem.'"' The restored monarchy was seriously weakened,
 
however, by a lack of Persian support; it was perceived as a
 
rallying point around which nationalists would cause
 
considerable trouble for the Empire.^® The fracturing of
 
Judaic politics resulted, in 322 B.C.E., in the absorption
 
of Palestine (re-settled Canaan) into the Empire of
 
Alexander, and hence, into the Hellenistic sphere of Graeco-

Roman culture
 
Seleucid Domination (201-141 B.C.E)
 
After the disintegration of Alexander's empire in 305
 
B.C.E., when administration of the various satrapies was
 
contested within the upper echelons of Macedonian
 
leadership, Palestine found itself at the center of a geo
 
political struggle. The Ptolemaic Dynasty in Egypt
 
initially supported the Seleucid cause against Antigonus,
 
48
 
who had seized the reigns of power in Babylon in 315 B.C.E.
 
After a decisive victory at Gaza, in 312, Seleucus laid
 
claim to all the lands west of Babylon, including Syria and
 
Palestine. Although Antigonus would try to re-establish his
 
influence in the region on several different occasions, he
 
ultimately failed, leaving Seleucid and Ptolemaic interests
 
to contend for political domination. For a considerable
 
length of time, Palestine was to be administered under
 
Ptolemaic rule; however, in 201 B.C.E., Antiochus III took
 
advantage of the chaotic situation after the death of
 
Ptolomy IV Philopator and re-exerted Seleucid control over
 
the Levant.®^
 
The process of Hellenization was well under way and
 
culturally, at least, had achieved some success. A class of
 
Hellenized Jews asserted their social and economic influence
 
in Palestine, complimenting the policies of Antiochus IV
 
Epiphanes, who now ruled as the Seleucid king.®^ That is
 
not to say that there was full compliance with Seleucid
 
interests; the traditionally held view that Jewish
 
opposition to Antiochus' policies was based upon religious
 
principle, however, has been largely overstated. In fact,
 
Antiochus' agenda was surprisingly liberal, resembling
 
nothing less than a re-articulation of Alexander's cultural
 
universalism. Antiochus' goals were mainly political and he
 
saw in the promulgation of the Zeus Olympius cult an
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opportunity for national and social unity rather than
 
religious persecution.®^ Similarly, the intrigues which
 
resulted in the removal of Onias as High Priest in Jerusalem
 
can be interpreted as the result of political power
 
struggles between wealthy Jewish families for prominence in
 
the community and were not indicative of any particular
 
religious agenda.®^ The proposed rest^^ucturing of political
 
power, that would establish Jerusalem as a poJis in the
 
Hellenistic scheme, galvanized the opposition into an
 
organized nationalistic movement.®^
 
In the effort to gain popular support, this movement
 
utilized a historical holy war propaganda as a type of
 
unitive methodology. By this time, however, the political
 
struggle for independence was indistinguishable from the
 
ideology it employed. Whereas ancient theocratic government
 
had first employed religious ideology, socio-pplitical
 
independence movements now expropriated it with a devotion
 
deepened by time and tradition. Thus, it seems, Antiochus
 
was entirely justified in equating Jewish religion with
 
Jewish nationalism, as the armies of Judas Maccabeus
 
expropriated orthodox theocratic nationalism from the
 
Deuteronomic literature in the struggle for an independent
 
Judaea.®® Indeed, the rebuilt Temple was the central symbol
 
of opposition in this nationalistic movement, as the
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Maccabean leaders became increasingly obsessed with Seleucid
 
sabotage of legitimate priestly authority (as evidenced by
 
the usurpation of Onias).
 
The "Hasmonean revolt", as it has been
 
historians, must be adequateTy examined iri social scientific
 
terms. To begin with, the word "revolt" is singularly vague
 
and self-defeating; it implies something between a
 
revolution and a rebellion. The nationalistic movement
 
under the Maccabees was in no sense a revolution.
 
It neither advocated nor achieved any structural change in
 
the administration of Judaic government, religious law, or
 
cultural institutions. It merely re-articulated the demand
 
for an autonomous Jewish state with a recognized central .
 
government in Jerusalem. ,Additionally, it sought to reverse
 
some of the innovations (especially religious) that had been
 
introduced by the Seleucids in an attempt to foster
 
ecumenism. Antiochus, as determined as he was to introduce
 
Hellenistic religious forms, did not propose the destruction
 
of Jerusalem or the influence of the ruling elite there. He
 
was merely interested in the subversion of Jewish authority
 
to his own purposes; in short, he utilized existing Jewish
 
institutions in pursuit of the Hellenistic cause. The
 
nationalistic agenda, in turn, focused on removal of the
 
Seleucids from power and the restoration of a Jewish state.
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This fact firrtily establishes the "Hasmonean revolt" as
 
nothing more than an uprising, or rebellion, with limited
 
objectives.
 
Were these objectives indicative of a spiritual agenda,
 
as traditional sources have so insistently maintained?
 
There is evidence to suggest that the Hellenistic reform of
 
Temple worship threatened the political interests of
 
Jerusalem more than it did the spirituality of its
 
inhabitants. If the Judaean population recognized their
 
monotheism as an object that had withstood incredible odds
 
,and countless threats to its existence, then the Hellenistic
 
reforms represented merely another temporary burden that the
 
Jewish nation would have to endure. There were political
 
reasons, however, for opposition to Seleucid policies.
 
Chief among them was the notion that growing dissatisfaction
 
with the Judaic temple cult (indeed, the entire Jerusalem
 
bureaucracy) was increasing among the native (Palestinian)
 
population. This translated as increased support for the
 
policies of Antiochus. Since the re-establishment of an
 
Israelite kingdom in Palestine, the centralization of
 
political and religious authority in Jerusalem had achieved
 
unprecedented levels. The temple sacrifice and laws of
 
ritual observance, as well as staggering taxes in support of
 
the bureaucracy in Jerusalem, produced an increasingly
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hostile underclass, known as the am ha-arez, who saw the
 
Hellenistic reforms as a welcome respite from the economic
 
and ritualistic burdens placed on them.®®
 
Ultimately, however, the theocratic nationalism of
 
scripture was too compelling to ignore and the exhortations
 
to action, which were now laced with the religious fervor of
 
the mythic kingdoms of David and Solomon, began to fall on
 
interested ears.®® Holy War, in its final incarnation as a
 
Judaic nationalistic instrument, was finally being waged
 
against the Hellenistic unbeliever. In this environment of
 
religious nationalism, the propaganda of the political
 
opposition expropriated the apocalyptic terminology (usually
 
reserved for messianic literature) that defined their
 
enemies as "abominations" in the eyes of the Lord.®°
 
Roman Occupation of Palestine (62 B.C.E.-135 C.E.)
 
By 142 B.C.E., the Seleucids had succumbed to Jewish
 
nationalist demands, exempting Judah from taxation and
 
allowing the emergence of Simon Maccabeus "great high-

priest, military commissioner, and leader of the Jews" to
 
assume the mantle of theocratic power and authority in
 
Jerusalem.®^ With the advent of Roman political influence
 
in the region, Judah's brief attempt to reassert the
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theocratic principle of government abruptly ended.®^ If
 
religious objections to Hellenistic assimilatiohistpdiicies
 
had been the decisive factor in the popularity of Maccabean
 
holy war, then one would expect to find a decrease of
 
nationalistic tendencies in the period of Roman Occupation
 
of Palestine. The Romans, unlike the Seleucids, saw no
 
compulsion to force an ecumenism on the native peoples they
 
conquered, especially if those peoples possessed the
 
historical and scriptural tradition that typified the
 
religion of the ancient Jews. If an ecumenism developed on
 
its own, so much the better; however, the Romans perceived
 
the safest road to political stability to be paved with
 
accomodation and protection of indigenous culture.
 
Despite this, a vibrant nationalism emerged in Roman
 
Palestine that claimed its inheritance from the Maccabean
 
(Hasmonean) uprising of the second century B.C.
 
Given the absence of a threat to religious authority, 
there arose two separate and distinct Judaic "attitudes" ■, 
during this period. The "universalistic" attitude tended to 
focus on religious themes and largely avoided contemporary 
political reality (consequently surviving well into the 
period of diaspora) . The "particularistic" attitude was a 
political manifestation of nationalistic trends and 
represented a continuation of the Maccabean struggle.®^ 
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Additionally, several groups existed in Judaic society that
 
advocated a variety of responses to the imperialism of Rome;
 
assimilationists, isolationists, and nationalists. The
 
assimilationists saw no disadvantage in the marriage between
 
Judaic and Roman culture; consequently, they cooperated
 
fully with Roman political authority. This group was
 
comprised of wealthy individuals, many of whom occupied high
 
priestly office.®® Isolationists were apathetic to foreign
 
domination as long as they were left alone to their
 
intellectual and spiritual pursuits. Nationalists, of
 
course, would countehance no toleration of any alien
 
government of Palestine, let alone the presence of the
 
arrogant Romans.
 
It was indeed the case that Roman government of
 
Palestine was especially cruel, and was demonstrated by the
 
lack of charatter and foresight of several governors.®^
 
Increasingly, the Judaean "monarchy", which was revived by
 
the Roman triumvirate's endorsement of the Edomite Herod/
 
was regarded as an instrument of apostasy and betrayal. The
 
final insult to Judaic nationalists was the partition of
 
Palestine in 57 B.C.E. by Gabinius. This act effectively
 
shattered any political cohesion that had tenuously existed
 
in the province. A testimony to the strength and durability
 
of nationalism in Judaic society exists in the fact that no
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amount of public deference to the institution of the temple
 
(as exhibited by construction) could sway the
 
zealots from their cause: political independence for
 
Jerusalem. By now, because of a Roman policy of
 
accomodationy the Cause had been stripped of its religioUs
 
tpappin^^ Spiritually minded Jews busied themselves with
 
the ritual observance allowed by the Romans and their own
 
intellectual pursuits. Realistically, then, the zealots
 
(and those who would come after them during the Bar Kokhba
 
rebellion) were political agitators, not holy warriors.
 
For almost fourteen hundred years, Judaic nationalism,
 
founded on the principles of theocratic government and
 
centralization of authority in Jerusalem, had worked with
 
sporadic success to rid the Jewish people of unwanted
 
foreign domination. The rhetoric of holy war had helped to
 
formulate the groundswell of support that made these
 
principles attainable. In the attempts of the Deuteronomist
 
to construct a national past, we can see how, in scripture,
 
"history" became "rhetoric".®® The strongest theocratic and
 
holy war concepts emerged from .periods in which Judaic
 
society experienced great turmoil and social upheaval: The
 
periods of confederacy, Solomonic government/ Assyrian
 
conquest, Seleucid domination, and Roman occupation. It/ ; , ^
 
would only be the Hasmonean rulers of the second century:
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B.C.E., however, who would actually enjoy the fruits of
 
total theocratic power. It has been argued by some that
 
Judaic holy war, precisely because it was fashioned in
 
periods of crisis when Israelite political power was weak,
 
was never implemented at all.®® Given the current research
 
regarding the episode at Masada, it seems premature to deny
 
that a committed Jewish nationalism (translated into holy
 
war rhetoric) existed, at least in Roman Palestine, perhaps
 
even ioefore then. Perhaps it is true that even the
 
monarchic rulers of Israel had been too weak to wage holy
 
war; however, the Hasmonean revolt and subsequent opposition
 
to Roman authority in Palestine certainly took on the
 
aspects of a holy struggle.^°°
 
The nationalism of theocracy was born of necessity. ,
 
All around the fledgleing Israelite kingdoms larger, more
 
dominating powers existed. For the Jews of the Exodus, God
 
had provided them with the stability they needed.
 
Eventually, as rulers sought to create the sense of national
 
and cultural identity so essential for a united people, they
 
relied on the powerful forces of spirituality. A holy war
 
mentality was seen as a vital component of that effort. In
 
the effort to understand the human proclivity for war, we
 
must acknowledge that religion is often expropriated as an
 
ideology. That is not to say that religion has no
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culpability in the ability to arouse fervor and conviction;
 
however, if one were to eliminate the political motivations
 
for war that typify theocratic government and social
 
activism, then it might well prove that the essential
 
conditions for "religious war" have diminished. Such was
 
the case in Roman Palestine. When the religious agenda was
 
removed from the political struggle for independence, the
 
zealots were left with a rhetoric devoid of spiritual
 
exhortation. After the fall of Jerusalem, the political
 
motives that inspired Judaic holy war would remain dormant
 
until the emergence of the Zionist movement and the
 
establishment of the modern Israeli state.
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GHAPTER TWO: THE CHRISTIAN SWORD
 
as a propagandistic tooi of
 
theocratic government with a means for unifying and
 
cpordinating national sentiment in a highly cprapetitive
 
environment. Unlike ancient Judaism, Christianity did not
 
emerge as a faith defined by land covenant. That is to say,
 
although Jesus proclaimed the establishment of a "new
 
covenant" between God and His people, the contract was
 
understood in spiritual terms and gradually assumed
 
universal applications. While God's first covenant had
 
promised land (thereby inferring nationhood) to the Hebrew
 
tribes, it was unclear if the new relationship recognized
 
the necessity for a theocratic nation at all, especially
 
given the fact that the "New Jerusalem" was seen as a
 
heavenly city, opened to all who believed. In this sense,
 
the focus of Christianity was not to conquer so much as it
 
was to proclaim the message, attract converts, and endure
 
persecution. Eventually, the Christian Church would develop
 
alongside secular institutions (like the imperium and local
 
kingship) that would challenge its status as a theocracy
 
throughout the Medieval Period. In a way, Christian
 
theocracy was a three-headed hydra, each head representing
 
the competing agendas of imperial expansion, papal reform
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and local ]<i.ngsliip. Initially/ like the Israelites of the
 
Ancient Period, the Christians found themselves in a chaotic
 
and competitive enyironment fighting for their very Survival
 
in an empire in which they were regarded as political and
 
religious dissidents. It seemed reasonable, then, that this
 
new faith would develop some justification for conflict,
 
especially given the challenges it faced. After the
 
conversion of Constantino in 312 C.E., it became clear that
 
a national Christian ideology was imminent. Thus began the
 
development of Christian holy war. '
 
It is true that the development of Christian scripture
 
was a product of its time, just as the books of the Torah
 
were of theirs; but, because of the immediacy of the events
 
that it purported to describe, the New Testament's agenda :
 
was more rigid than that of the Old Testament. To a large
 
extent, Judaic holy war benefitted from the utilitarian
 
approach of the Israelite community regarding scripture;
 
essentially, scripture was molded in Israel to fit the
 
designs of its theocratic leaders. While Judaic holy war
 
themes advanced, receded, and re-emerged over a period of
 
nearly a thousand years of scriptural development, Christian
 
;holy war emerged independent of any comparitively long
 
scriptural history, relying instead on the initial Gospel
 
formulated in the first three centuries of Christian
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thought. Depriyed of a fluid scriptural tradition, the
 
medieval Church found it necessary to interpret this Gospel
 
loosely in an attempt to establish a Christian perogative
 
for defense. Although, in this sense, scripture was^
 
Utilized as propaganda, Christians often found New Testament
 
references ambiguous and misleading. For this reason, the
 
Church augmented its defense of Christian warfare with Old
 
Testament verses. With a "deadline" proposed for the
 
acceptance of public revelation after the codification of
 
scripture in 397 C.E., the historical development of
 
Christian holy war theries, based on interpretive elements,
 
became even more apparent.
 
Briefly outlined, the major trends in Christian
 
history, philosophy, and culture that contributed to the
 
concept of holy war, culminating in the Crusades, were as
 
, follows.:
 
(1) Initial toleration of baptism for those
 
Serving in the military.
 
(2) A "hostile" reaction to persecution and
 
a negative view of military service
 
(reliance on "pacifistic" teachings of
 
Christ).
 
(3) Conversion of Constantino and an
 
acceptance of military service in the
 
defense of a "Christian Empire" (a
 
permanent fixture in the east).
 
(4) A theoretical justification for war
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against "injustice" and an articulation
 
of holy war as the prerogative of
 
Christian rulers by Augustine (reliance
 
on O.T. and ambiguous N.T. texts).
 
(5) Decline of the Western Imperium. German
 
Comiaanders defending remnants of a
 
Western "Christian Empire".
 
(6) A resurgence of "anti-militancy" among
 
Christian writers and Arian kings (in
 
the west), Papal defense of military
 
service as a "lesser virtue".
 
(7) Imperial power re-asserted in the west
 
(Justinian's conquests),
 
(8) Western suspicion of Byzantine motives.
 
Cautious Papal contacts and eventual
 
alliance with Germanic military powers.
 
(9) Islamic expansion in the east.
 
Implementation of Augustine's holy
 
war model by a secular ruler
 
(Charlemegne). Wars fought to
 
defend and extend the faith. Papal
 
objections.
 
(10) Ninth century invasions from Muslim,
 
Viking, and Magyar armies. Increasing
 
dependence on military force for
 
survival. Bishops become vassals in
 
the feudal system.
 
(11) Emergence of the Pope as a military
 
leader. Papal campaigns against the
 
Normans and Henry IV. Rise in the
 
"ethos of knighthood" and the holy
 
war,s of the "reconquista" in Spain.
 
(12) Crusade.
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The First Two Centuries of" Christianity
 
Amid the earliest Apostolic contacts with the west,
 
both Peter and Paul attracted a small segment of the Jewish
 
population in Rome. Christianity's reputation as a
 
messianic "mystery cult" inevitably grew, appealing to
 
another, much larger, constituency: the Roman army. Pre
 
occupied as they were with concepts such as death,
 
resurrection, and personal salvation, Roman soldiers (who
 
retained the western prejudice for tangible philosophies)
 
welcomed a religion whose saviour's existence was well
 
established in the historical record. The best evidence
 
suggesting a sizable Christian presence in the army of Rome
 
comes from Tertullian (200 C.E.) in his attempt to quiet
 
suspicions concerning the popularity of the new faith.
 
Tertullian, of course, would reverse himself and argue
 
passionately against military service when Christian
 
attitudes, fueled by persecution, hardened and he drifted
 
inexorably toward Montanist heresy.
 
These persecutions would have a profound effect upon
 
later generations of Christians and their participation (or
 
criticism) of.military service. The first century
 
persecutions under Nero,and Domitiah tended to be sporadic,
 
local affairs, unremarkable in their lack of breadth and
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zeal. The second century persecution orchestrated during
 
the reign of Marcus Aurelius, however, produced a pervasive
 
anti-militancy in the Christian body.^°^ The dual nature of
 
the Roman state as a pagan entity and political oppressor
 
only exacerbated this process. Throughout the first two
 
hundred years of Christianity, however, there seemed to be
 
considerable confusion regarding the proper Christian
 
response to war.
 
Interestingly, first century Christians borrowed
 
heavily from the miltaristic vocabulary (bequeathed to them
 
by the Deuteronomic author of the Torah) in an attempt to
 
convey a sense of spiritual warfare.^°^ Although this
 
language was largely metaphorical, it belied a lack of
 
consensus either for or against miliary service, even as
 
late as the second century C.E. Certainly, Paul's opinions
 
regarding obedience to civil authority stood in stark
 
contrast to the second century idealism of St. Justin
 
Martyr. St. Justin's intriguing reference to "every other
 
kind of iniquity" suggests that oppostion to military
 
service may, at least in part, have been motivated by anti-

pagan rather than pacifistic tendencies. Many more
 
Christians heeded the words of Jesus and rendered "to Caesar
 
what belonged to Caesar".^°^
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Third Century Christianity
 
However Christians defined their duties to the state in
 
these first critical years, by the third century, largely
 
attributable to'the cult of martyrdom and a growing
 
resentment of Roman political authority, perceptions were
 
clearly changing. Tertullian, who had boasted of Christian
 
service in the armies of Rome, now in 210 C.E. completely a
 
Montanist, bitterly railed against Christian hypocrites who
 
betrayed their faith by enlistment.^"® His arguments were
 
coherent, although regrettably tainted by his fierce anti-

pagan agenda.^"'' Others, like Hippolytus, embraced a genuine
 
pacifism."® These third century Christian pacifists
 
selectively utilized the various teachings of Jesus that
 
complimented their agenda (Mt.5:9, 26:52; Lk.6:27-28 and
 
Jn.18:36). It must be remembered that, although these
 
teachings carried considerable authority, they had not yet
 
reached the status of canonical scripture. Consequently, it
 
was easy for pacifists to circumvent .the more ambiguous,
 
less friendly references to militancy in the teachings of
 
their master (Mt.8:5-13, 10:34-36, Lk.14:23, 22:36 and
 
Jn.2:15).^^° The pacifistic school ignored the Old Testament
 
altogether, not only because of its Warrior-God, but also
 
because there was a growing sense among all Christians that
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the old covenant was now superceded by the new.^^^
 
At the same time that pacifism was beginning to emerge
 
as a Christian ethic/ another perspective was being
 
developed that also found its inspiration in the sufferings
 
of the martyrs. In short, the suffering endured by the
 
persecuted Christians of the second century was increasingly
 
seen as having cleansing or purgative properties As the
 
purgative effect of martyrdom was acknowledged, Christians
 
began to see the efficacy of sharing the blessings derived
 
from suffering with those misdirected individuals who
 
espoused heresy. Just as faith in suffering was proclaimed a
 
victory in the war against personal sin, so would the
 
application of suffering be proclaimed a valid weapon in the
 
war against heresy. As will be seen, this constituted the
 
first expression of a militant attitude in Christian
 
culture; one which would eventually be directed at the
 
heretic population with purgative measures intended to
 
cleanse them of their perceived iniquities. In a sense,
 
Christian warfare developed from within, as a response to
 
those in Christian society who threatened its unity. In the
 
third century, however, there was no recognizable Christian
 
society to speak of; cohsiequently, the "positive" attributes
 
of suffering remained an element of mythic martyrdom. As
 
the fourth century approached, the cultural environment of
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 the Roman empire was to undergo a fiindamental alteration.
 
I
 Fourth Century Christianity
 
Amid the chaotic disintegration of the Roman Tetrarchy
 
in 312 C.E., the ambitious general Constantine achieved a
 
significant military victory at the Milvian bridge just
 
outside of Rome.^^^ By itself, this battle would have hardly
 
mattered; the events that subseguently transpired
 
constituted nothing less than a revolution in the way
 
Christians viewed the world around them. Constantine, the
 
Christians insisted, had received a sign from God. There
 
was some initial confusion, however, regarding the proper
 
interpretation of this sign. While some claimed it was the
 
symbol of "Sol Invictus" (the Unconquered Sun), others, >
 
especially thoue who kept the general's confidence,
 
identified it as the "Chi-Ro" of Christian symbology. What
 
is clear is that Constantine regarded Christianity in a much
 
more favorable light after his victory. Specifically,
 
Constantine's so-Called conversion to Christianity would
 
have a significant impact on the Christian concept of war
 
throughout the medieval period.
 
The Edict of Milan produced a surge of mass conversions
 
to the Christian faith, the extent of which has never been
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duplicated in history. These new Christians were
 
fundamentally committed to the preservation of the empire.
 
The myth of the Milvian bridge loomed large, convincing many
 
that the empire enjoyed the blessings of God; consequently,
 
it now deserved their protection. In a move startingly
 
similar 'to Josiah's purge of the Judaean Kingdom in 622
 
B.C.E., Constantine attempted to unify Roman society under
 
the banner of Christianity. Although he remained somewhat
 
tolerant of traditional Roman religion at first, Constantine
 
was eventually swayed by Christian sentiment to deny access
 
to the ancient cultic temples. In this way, Constantine
 
sought to establish the "peace of the church" throughout his
 
empire.
 
The language of this attempt at theocratic nationalism
 
echoed the extreme lessons of martyrdom; purgation^
 
chastisement^ salvation. It was theocratic all the more
 
because the,emperor now regarded himself as Tsapostolos, or
 
equal in stature to the original apostles. Church and state
 
were intimate partners in this endeavor, striving to
 
rediscover a national purpose under the auspices of
 
Christian unity. Constantine adopted a strinkingly severe
 
policy in regard to pagans and heretics; he soon enacted
 
legislation that would punish those who disobeyed Imperial
 
decrees with death. It is difficult to ignore the
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 connections between this policy and the contemporary
 
acknowledgment of martyrdom's efficacy. Additionally, this
 
strident attitude was influencing Christian attitudes toward
 
war. War in the service of a Christian empire, like capital
 
punishment as a means of Christian unity, was increasingly
 
seen as a positive good. Thus, it is apparent that a
 
militant response was developing, throughout the duration of
 
Constantino's reign, as a means of achieving the "pre
 
determined ends" of Roman government: territorial integrity
 
and social stability.
 
. (.
 
Fifth Century Christianity
 
The militancy of Christian society would be Codified in
 
theory by the chief theologian of the next generation,
 
Augustine of Hippo (354-430 C.E.). Influenced by the
 
harshness of the Theodosian Code and the increasing
 
instability of the western empire in the late fourth and
 
early fifth centuries, Augustine articulated a coherent
 
philosophy designed to justify the use of force from a
 
Christian perspective. For Augustine, the problem was
 
essential: how may Christians defend empire and faith
 
without violation of the gospel message? The military
 
threats were predominantly from Germanic tribes to the north
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who pressed in on the Roman frontier with uncomfortable
 
regularity. Domestically, Christianity was besieged by a
 
heretical fringe that threatened to splinter the fragile
 
unity of the theocratic state. In regard to heresy,
 
Augustine, at first optimistic about the church's prospects
 
for establishing a constructive dialogue, urged restraint
 
After his episcopate at Hippo (and the protracted conflict
 
with the Donatist heresy), however, Augustine would become
 
considerably disillusioned.
 
In actuality, largely due to the deterioration of the
 
western empire (which had been hastened by the demise of the
 
last effective emperor in Rome) Christians increasingly
 
found themselves adrift in a sea of conflicting loyalties.
 
Some still held out hope that with such able commanders as
 
Stilicho and Aetius holding the Vandals and Burgundians in
 
check, there was still a western Christian empire worth
 
defending. Others, surrounded by the reality of imperial
 
decay, acknowledged that the mantle of defense had been
 
inherited by the institutional Church. To a very large
 
extent, Augustine belonged to this group. He had always
 
been critical of Rome from a cultural and spiritual
 
perspective. The idea of Roman culture in decline delighted
 
him; indeed, when Rome was besieged in 410 he refused to
 
mourn its passing. The concept Of theocracy, however.
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intrigued him and he increasingly urged the state to take
 
repressive measures in the war against heresy.
 
Interestingly, Augustine seemed at home in both camps,
 
weaving his theory of militancy deep within the fabric of
 
ehristian society.
 
There were some in the Church, however, for whom the
 
mantle of defense was an unwelcome burden. These dissenters
 
issued a renewal of third century pacifism that stood in
 
opposition to the "disturbing innovations" of Augustinian
 
theory."® For one thing, Augustine had compromised his
 
early views on heresy, taking a much harder line in his
 
opposition to the heretical agenda. By 417 C.E., he was
 
convinced that "righteous persecution" was an indespensable
 
weapon in the Christian arsenal, to be used against heretics
 
with "the spirit of love"."® The principal opponents of
 
Augustine's new found fervor included such respected
 
Christian figures as Socrates Scholasticus, Sulpicus
 
Severus, and Vincent of Lerins. All articulated the
 
traditional third century response to crisis within the
 
Church; to paraphrase St. Vincent: "to cleave to antiquity,
 
leaving the impious crowd to its own madness.
 
Applying this same sense of urgency to the problem of
 
national defense, Augustine established the rule by which
 
Christians could effectively measure the efficacy of a
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E)otential war. Specific Gonditions were rendered for the
 
waging of "just wars" utilizing Constantino's "peace of the
 
church" as a model. Far from, the third century Christian
 
ethic, Augustine now regarded military service as nothing
 
less than a charism.i^^ ; The single requirementifor the
 
waging of just war, however, was clearly articulated, "A
 
just war", Augustine asserted, "is justified only by the
 
injustice of the aggressor. Augustine did not stop
 
there, however. A true creature of the Constantinan Age,
 
the north African bishop proceeded to develop a theory by
 
which a Christian ruler could wage "holy war", with
 
considerably less restrictions than those imposed on just
 
war. The Christian ethic, according to Augustine, should
 
always be guided by "rational justice". It should be noted,
 
that there is a noticable lack of recourse to "injustice"
 
as a pre-condition for holy war in Augustine's appeal. By
 
the fifth century, war could be waged "at God's bidding" and
 
heresy exterminated by God's authorization of a "general
 
law", allowing "certain exceptions." There is an obvious
 
influence of Old Testament kingship in Augustine's writings
 
on the subject of holy war. In the final analysis,
 
Augustine acknowledged that the "writings of Moses" did
 
indeed bear relevancy to the fifth century Christian world.
 
There was, of course, disagreement with Augustine's
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theories on the matter. Orusius, for one, saw evidence of
 
God's hand even in the threatening advance of the Germanic
 
tribes into Roman territory. Interestingly, it was in the
 
quasi-heretical world of secular authority that some of the
 
most moderate voices were heard. At the very end of the
 
fifth century, long after the seizure of Ravenna by Odoacer
 
and the disappearance of the western imperium, Theodoric (an
 
Arian Ostrogoth) called for the establishment of toleration
 
and restraint. Theodoric's "enlightened" views, however,
 
were ultimately tainted by his heretical stance, as he could
 
hardly argue for militancy in the face of his own opposition
 
to Christian orthodoxy. Additionally, the necessities of
 
territorial integrity were too immediate for the Christian
 
world to ignore, and, despite differing views on the
 
Empire's value vis-a-vis the Christian Society, Augustine's
 
views increased in popularity.
 
At the center of this fifth century controversy stood ,
 
the papacy. Increasingly, ever since the power vacuum left
 
by the death of Valentinan I in 375 and the sack of Rome by
 
Alaric in 410, the bishop of Rome had gradually accrued
 
secular authority to himself, having been left in charge of.
 
the defenses of both Rome and its surrounding Italian lands.
 
He realized only too well the necessities of civil defense,
 
and yet, he still considered it his prime duty to preserve
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the "purity" of the Gospel message. Leo the Great, who
 
ascended to the papacy in 440 C.E., accepted Augustine's
 
premise that force should used to defend the Christian
 
society. That force, in Leo's view, should have been the
 
imperial army; as a practical matter, it was not. The very
 
idea of Christians themselves fighting and killing in wars
 
horrified Leo. Soldiers, he could theofize, at least were
 
capable of delaying baptism until the distasteful work of
 
military service was completed. For baptised Christians, it
 
was unthinkable to even contemplate returning to military
 
service after "having done penance". Leo also compared
 
military service unfavorably to the vocations of monastic
 
life, establishing it as a "lesser virtue
 
Ironically, the answer to the pope's dilemma lay in
 
compromise with the Arian Germanic tribes. Theodoric,
 
although his Arianism would not allow him to defend the
 
Church per se, still saw ample reason to defend the borders
 
of what had been the old Christian Empire. The Church, of
 
course, realized that this included, the lands under its
 
authority. This effectively relieved the papacy (which had
 
been occupied since 482 C.E. by Felix II) of the
 
responsibility of Christian defense; for the present moment,
 
Arian armies Would secure western lands and provide some
 
political stability for the Church to attend to liturgical,
 
74
 
dQctrinal, and bureauGratid matters.
 
The Myth of the Monolithic Church
 
Historians since the Enlightenment have painted a
 
gloomy picture of the Middle Ages, often contrasting the
 
perceived brilliance of their own age with the environment
 
of the "Dark Ages". The terminology itself ("Enlightenment"
 
vs. "Dark" Ages) belies a conscious attempt to interpret
 
history. The most enduring stereotype of medieval Europe is
 
that of the "monolithic Church". As the chaotic events of
 
the fifth century unfolded, the western Church emerged as a
 
political, bureaucratic, and administrative institution that
 
worked to build a foundation of Christian culture in post-

imperial Europe. The power this Church wielded, however,
 
was largely symbolic and indirect. That is to say, that
 
whenever moral or doctrinal questions were addressed,
 
secular authority normally deferred to the prestige of the
 
Roman pontiff; political matters were often considered the
 
perogative of kings. Popes could advise, cajole, even
 
threaten monarchs; without the resolve to militarize and
 
raise armies, the fifth century Church was a mere paper
 
tiger. '\
 
In the absence of any real power, papal statements
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often utilized a high degree of hyperbole, claiming
 
authority in matters usually considered the domain of
 
secular rulers. Whereas the Constantinian model of
 
theocracy provided for the administration of Church affairs
 
by the state, the Church now attempted, with modest success,
 
to construct a theocracy in which the state was administered
 
by the ecclesiastical bureaucracy. Consequently, the Church
 
extended its secular authority to the lands surrounding Rome
 
and central Italy (a development hardly surprising, given
 
the emerging Papal role in civic defense), in addition to
 
the larger imperial claims it was making in the west.
 
Indeed, the self-defined mission of the Church had changed
 
much since the reign of Valentinian I, when the bishops
 
could say, "The state is not in the Church, but the Church
 
is in the state. In this regard, the chair of Peter was
 
engaged in a risky enterpise; the Germanic kings saw little
 
reason to respect the territorial claims of a Papacy that
 
had denounced their own Arian faith. What the Church
 
needed, and spent considerable time nurturing, was a core of
 
Germanic support for Latin Christianity.
 
Sixth Century Christianity
 
Perhaps the most timely conversion in Christian history
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occurred in 500 C.E. as Clevis, a Frankish king, accepted
 
the Latin faith. Much more than Thedoric, Glovis was the
 
living embodiment Of fierce Germanic kingship; and now,
 
fotunately for the Church, he was orthodox. Even during the
 
years preceding his conversion, the Church recognized a
 
quality in Clevis that made him a desirable asset.
 
Ecclesiastical leaders tried to moderate his intemperate
 
personality, often advising him in secular affairs. A
 
theme of divine providence permeated the story of his
 
conversion, perhaps an apocryphal attempt to illustrate the
 
importance of the event by comparing it to Constantino's
 
experience in 312. Significantly, this myth contained an
 
action of God on behalf of Clovis' army, much like that
 
performed at the Milvian Bridge."^ Clovis' conversion paved
 
the way for the inclusion of many Germanic, previously
 
Arian, tribes (like the Burgundians) in the communion of
 
Latin Christianity. Politically, there would be no
 
immediate solutions for the papacy; parochial issues still
 
impeded the progress of a unified Christian culture.
 
Concurrent to this period of gradual Frankish hegemony,
 
there occurred a general "Germanization" of the episcopate
 
in response to Church decrees forbidding the clergy from
 
bearing arms in defense of the Merovingian state. This
 
was typified by the institutionalization of Germanic
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cultural norms regarding warfare within the philosophy of
 
western Christendom. Although the Church still chafed at
 
the prospect of Christians fighting wars, the growing
 
intimacy with Clovis would have profound consequences for
 
Medieval political history; particularly, that pertaining to
 
the methods employed by the Church for its very survival.
 
The notorius "blood-feuds" of the Franks, for example, and
 
the influence they wielded on an increasingly German
 
episcopate would hamper papal attempts to restrict warfare
 
to the unbaptised secular world.
 
Similarly, Germanic laws governing the brutal
 
institution of trial by ordeal helped to shape a western
 
European culture that was heir to this Germanic/Classical
 
Christian synthesis. In the,attempt to effectively
 
Christianize the various elements of Prankish culture,
 
Martin of Tours would go so far as to expropriate all
 
secular functions, even those traditionally associated with
 
militarism, and absorb them into the heirarchical structure
 
of the Church. Christianization was an intricate process,
 
given the resiliency of native culture; a militant approach
 
only made it even more difficult.
 
Adding to the turmoil of this chaotic environment was
 
an effort to reconquer western lands by the Emperor
 
Justinian in Byzantium. In response to an increasingly
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hostile Arian presence in Europe, Justinian attempted to
 
reunite the last vestiges of Constantino's Christian Empire;
 
unfortunately for imperial interests, he was only partly
 
successful. Although many lands were recovered, they soon
 
reverted to Arian control after the eventual retreat of
 
Byzantine forces. What was far more significant about the
 
Justinian conquests was the role it played in resurrecting
 
ideas of empire, especially in western minds.
 
Additionally, the unsolicited presence of Byzantine
 
armies in the west only fueled suspicion of Imperial
 
motives, thereby strengthening papal resolve to pursue
 
alternative options for political stability and survival.
 
These included the forging of closer ties with Frankish
 
kingdoms. By 579, Pope Gelasius II, recognizing the
 
vulnerability of the Church in the west, entertained
 
thoughts of a formal alliance with the Franks.
 
Interestingly, it was Gelasius who would develop the popular
 
"two swords" philosophy of Medieval Christianity. Briefly
 
put, this theory argued that there were two sources of
 
authority in a Christian society, spiritual and secular, and
 
that the spiritual,authority always eclipsed that of the
 
secular domain. This principle applied not only in Roman
 
civil affairs, but those involving the larger Christian
 
community. It is hard not to acknowledge the parallels
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between Gelasius' and Martin of Tours' concepts of Christian
 
authority.
 
As the Lombard threat in Italy increased, a man of
 
exceptional political talents ascended to the chair of St.
 
Peter. Gregory the Great clearly recognized the nature of
 
the Church's dilemma and strengthened diplomatic ties with
 
the Merovingian dynasty of the Franks. For the first time
 
in the short history of the Church, a pope now openly
 
embraced Christian militarism. In a bold move intended to
 
distance the political objectives of the west from those of
 
the east, Gregory rebuked the emperor in Byzantium for his
 
support of legislation prohibiting soldiers from pursuing
 
monastic vocations upon retirement. Certainly, military
 
service was still regarded as a "lesser virtue"; however,
 
Christians were no longer prohibited from taking an active
 
role in the defense of Christian society.
 
How much did these changing attitudes change practice
 
in the sixth century Church? For one thing, it is difficult
 
to believe that the ancient custom of witholding baptism for
 
those in military service was enforced any longer. In
 
essence, monastic life had replaced baptism as the Christian
 
object denied the soldier. No one was allowed to leave the
 
monastery for the army. Still, even as an imperfect
 
vocation, military service would become a integral part of
 
western ehristendoni.
 
The Church now bent itself to the task of forging
 
alliances. Gregory ordered missionaries like Augustine On
 
ambitious trips deep into the heart of Germanic and British
 
territory in an attempt to spread the Gospel, standardize
 
liturgical forms, initiate Latin reforms, and establish
 
political alliances with many of the powerful kingdoms of
 
the west. As an increasing number of rulers came under the
 
banner of Latin Christendom (now an emerging concept), Rome
 
enjoyed a new status as an administrative, legal and
 
political center. Many of the newly Christianized kingdoi^s
 
would look to Rome for guidance in the areas of legal
 
structure, religious orthodoxy, political stability (through
 
divine sanction) and morality. This misled the Church into
 
thinking that secular rulers had abdicated political control
 
to the ecclesiastical government of a Christian Europe.
 
Increasingly, diobedience to religious authority was
 
perceived as treason to the state. This perspective was
 
hot shared by secular rulers. Cultural influences, the
 
political neccessities of local rule, and the development of
 
coitimori law all influenced the actions of kings far more than
 
papal decrees from Rome; still, deference was paid, at least
 
superficially, to the structure that made it all possible:
 
the institutional Church.
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Seventh and Eighth Century Christianity
 
Papal-Frankish relations grew at an astonishing pace
 
throughout the seventh and well into the eighth century C.E.
 
Gregory II, ascending to the Papacy in 715, utilized the
 
talents of St. Boniface to reform the Prankish church and
 
lay the groundwork for official alliance. In 726, these
 
efforts seemed inspired when the Emperor in Byzantium, Leo
 
III (Isurian) broke with orthodoxy on the issue of icons.
 
No longer could the western Church rely upon the rhetoric of
 
"empire" to summon aid from the east. In 726, Pope Gregory
 
III appealed to the Carolingian chieftan Charles Martel for
 
aid against the Lombards in northern Italy and was refused.
 
Undaunted, the succeeding Pontiff (Stephen II) turned to
 
Charles' son, who desperately wanted papal sanction for
 
usurpation of the Frankish throne, with the same appeal. In
 
this way, all the efforts to build an alliance bore fruit.
 
In 754 C.E., Pepin recieved the blessings of the papacy in
 
his attempt to establish a Carolingian hegemony and the
 
Frankish-Papal Alliance was sealed.
 
The Church how had its defender; however, this
 
arrangement would prove to be disasterous for ecclesiastical
 
authority. At first, events seemed to favor the pope. In
 
his first impressive show of military force, Pepin subdued
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the Loii±)ard advance and claimed extensive territories for
 
the Frankish dominion. Upon regarding the Italian lands
 
that had become the secular domain of the Church since the
 
collapse of the western Empire, Pepin was presented with the
 
tradition of Constantine's "Donatio" and relented,
 
establishing the Church's secular authority over these
 
territories in perpetuity. Although Pepin deferred to the
 
authority to the Church, his son, Charles "the Great", would
 
make it absolutely clear by whose authority the papacy
 
possessed Italian lands.
 
Charlemagne (768-814 C.E.)
 
Amid the confusion of eighth century Roman politics,
 
the reigning pope found himself besieged by powerful
 
patrician families. These families brought serious charges
 
against Leo III, fanning the flames of popular sentiment and
 
threatening his very life with mob defiance. Charles the
 
Great in his Carolingian lands to the north, witnessed these
 
events with some discomfort. After receiving and absolving
 
the embattled pope (through traditional German ritual) the
 
Carolingian monarch was crowned Holy Roman Emperor by Leo.^^^
 
Some have seen this interchange as a complex power play by
 
secular and religious authorities: Charles by his absolution
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of the Pope establishing his dominance in the relationship;
 
Leo by his crowning of Charles proclaiming the pre-emminence
 
of Papal authority. What is clear is that Charles now saw
 
himself as the divinely appointed ruler of a new Christian
 
empire. He quickly began work on establishing a secular
 
administration that would rival the institutional Church's.
 
To some degree, Charles' was the only true theocratic
 
administration of the early Medieval period, in that it was
 
realized rather than theoretically proclaimed. Church
 
prelates were constantly preaching the superiority of
 
ecclesiastical authority from a position of weakness; ­
Charles, meanwhile, was making good on his promises of
 
absolute and complete power. Charles, blessed by the
 
presence of learned Celtic monks in his realm, also
 
witnessed the initial stages of a "Carolingian renaissance."
 
One of the Classical texts available to the emperor, indeed
 
his favorite work of Christian philosophy, was Augustine's
 
City of God.^^^
 
It was no coincidence, then, that Charlemagne was the
 
first theocratic ruler to put into practice the more radical
 
Augustinian theories of Christian warfare, including that
 
which articulated,a,holy war ethic. Regarding himself as
 
Augustine's "sword in the hand" of God, Charlemagne
 
proceeded to expand the Carolingian hegemony over vast
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expanses of what had once been the western Roman empire. He
 
fought against Islamic armies in the southwest, invaded
 
Bavaria, defeated :&vars and forcibly converted the Saxons in
 
the east. Assuredly^ most of this cdnquest was an effort
 
to extend Charles' own political power and secular influence
 
throughout Europe; however, he used the nationalism of
 
religious ideology to achieve his objectives Clearly,
 
Charles saw religious authority as a method by which to
 
further his own territorial and imperial ambitions. Despite
 
Papal objections, the art of Christian warfare so amply
 
cultivated by centuries of political neccesity, finally
 
blossomed under the secular influence of a fierce Prankish 
' king. ■ 
Ninth Century Christianity
 
Unfortunately for the Church, matters only got worse.
 
After the death of Charles, his empire was divided into two
 
principal regions: east and west Frankia. In 863, as heir
 
to the eastern throne, Lothar II found himself in
 
confrontation with Pope Nicholas I. By the time Nicholas
 
and Lothar died, leaving the entire issue of Theutaberga's
 
restoration and Waldrada's excommunication unresolved,
 
western imperial armies had marched on Rome and collusion
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between east and west Frankia had resulted in the partioning
 
of Italian lands between the two monarchs. It was during
 
this time that the Asturians, inspired by the martyrs of
 
Cordoba in 859, began a long struggle against the Umayyad
 
emirate for political control of Spain. These wars of
 
"reconquista", although they did not receive Prankish
 
support (Charles the Bald had maintained friendly relations
 
with the Umayyads), were significant for their holy war
 
rhetoric. It seems that when two faiths are at war, the
 
nationalism of religious ideology becomes all too necessary.
 
Significantly, the reconquista effort would eventually
 
capture the attention of imperial interests, providing a
 
model for the crusading armies to come.
 
For the moment, the Christians of Europe found
 
themselves under siege on several fronts simultaneously.
 
From the mid-ninth century on, waves of Viking invasions
 
devastated west Frankia, taking the imperial capitol of
 
Aachen and destroying Cologne, Andernach, and Koblenz.
 
These Viking incursions met the rapidly moving armies of
 
Islam in the Mediterranean. Muslim invasions of Italy,
 
although not terribly effective, had progressed as far as
 
Rome on two separate occasions (846 and 849 C.E.).
 
The flurry of military activity during this period of
 
European history hampered the ability of Rome to act as the
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"nerve center" of Christendom, directing the secular body
 
into action in times Of diminished iniperial power. Secuiar
 
lords were left to their pwn particular defensive
 
strategies, faced as they were with their own unique
 
military threats. In Charlemagne's empire the necessities
 
of defense had been relinquished to a secular megalomaniac;
 
now they were surrendered to local rulers overwhelmed by the
 
force of Viking invasion. This general environment of chaos
 
did not prevent the occasional emperor from intervening,
 
with regularity, in church affairs. . Finally, the spectacle
 
of Emperor Louis II manipulating papal elections in 855 was
 
too much to bear.-^® After the death of Louis, imperial and
 
papal power waned, leaving the Church vulnerable to the
 
warring nobility of the Italian cities. Increasingly, many
 
in the Church began to develop a taste for militancy, in
 
response to the sorry state of ecclesiastical affairs.
 
During this period as local kings began investing their
 
own candidates with the symbols of religious authority, many
 
local bishops became royal vassals, placing their secular
 
loyalties before their religious obligations to the papacy.
 
Thus, the "feudalization of the Church" took place; a
 
process by which war could be effectively preached at the
 
local level as a religious affair. As a concession to
 
traditional Christian exhortations to non-violence, bishops
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would fulfill their feudal obligations by funding armies
 
through Church coffers rather than fighting; this tended to
 
put an even greater strain on a centralized bureaucracy in
 
Rome that, as yet, was still in its infancy and would not
 
reach its full potential until the reforms of Leo IX in
 
1052. Thus, an opportunity for further imperial control
 
over the Church presented itself.
 
Tenth and Eleventh Century Christianity
 
The tenth century would prove to be a period of
 
recovery for the western imperium as Henry I ascended to the
 
throne in 919 C.E. Henry regarded himself as the heir of
 
Pepin in that he vigorously pursued the conquest of Lombard
 
lands in Italy and the further "Germanization" of the Church
 
in imperial territories. After the intense challenges to
 
Christian survival in the ninth century and having survived
 
the incursions of Vikings, Muslims, and Magyars, Europe
 
welcomed Henry's "holy" mission. Increasingly, weapons of
 
war became "holy objects" in this evolving culture of
 
theocratic nationalism. Henry's acquisition of the holy
 
lance from Rudolf II of Burgundy in anticipation of his
 
campaign against the Lombards was a testament to the
 
resiliency of Augustine's holy war ideal.
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 ■ After Henry's'sbnt Cft^tp 1/ consplidated power by 
reserving for himself tiie authority to confirm papal 
elections in 963, the stage was set for a monuraental: 
confrontation with the papacy. Still, there was a fair 
degree of cooperation between the two rulers. 
Ecclesiastical support for imperial resurgence brought 
about, for the first time, an explicit acceptance of 
militarism in the Church. By 1052, the odd spectacle of an 
imperial army led by a reigning pope (Leo IX), marching to 
engage the troublesome Normans of southern Italy, outraged 
no one. The political neccesities of the day required such 
action. The theocratic structure of European Christendom, 
divided as it was between competing notions of secular vs. 
religious authority, was threatened by Norman economic and 
political interests. It responded in a way any government 
might be expected to respond. 
Half-hearted attempts at establishing "the peace of
 
God" throughout the Christian domain were nothing more than
 
policies intended to bring about social stability, rather
 
than Christian brotherhood. No sooner had the peace of God
 
been proclaimed in 1063 when papal blessings were sent to
 
William the Bastard in his military campaign against Anglo-

Saxon Britain. Significantly, William rode into battle
 
armed with religious relics and a papal banner as symbols
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^of' his' right ;caus;e:..;i,,'ii'i :
 
European civilization in the eleventh century had
 
reached a critical point in its history. Crisis and
 
conflict now defined the "call to arms" as sacred. How else
 
to explain the savagery with which emperor and pope waged
 
war against one another in the years to come? The issue of
 
investiture would produce a tension between the emperor,
 
Henry V, and Pope Gregory VII that would result in the
 
actual preaching of a holy war by the pope himself.
 
Historically, popes had always reserved for themselves the
 
authority to urge others to action for the defense of the
 
Christian community. Leo IX had taken the extraordinary
 
step of actual command, and now, Gregory would preach a war
 
intended to enforce the orthodoxy of the Church against an
 
imperial renegade. Significantly, disobedience to
 
ecclesiastical decrees passed in Rome was by this time
 
regarded by the papacy as nothing less than spiritual
 
heresy. The motive for war was self-evident; the
 
establishment of proper authority in a Christian society.
 
The methods utilized by Gregory in convincing the German
 
nobility to oppose Henry, however, were couched in religous
 
propaganda. Gregory would eventually devise "ways under
 
divine inspiration" to wage an effective holy war against
 
Heriry.^^^ .
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Culturally, as well, European civilization had produced
 
the chivalric ideal in which the knight was sworn to defend
 
his lord and Church. In the highly competitive
 
environment of knighthood, religion, feudal obligations, and
 
violence blended perfectly to produce the fearsome fighting
 
machine of the Crusades, the Medieval knight. Also, by the
 
eleventh century, the reinvigorated reconquista effort
 
convinced many of the holiness of the political and military
 
struggle against Islam. The combination of feudal
 
politics (in which even vassal bishops preached and funded
 
holy wars), political struggles between popes and emperors,
 
systematic invasion, inter-faith conflicts (such as the
 
reconquista in Spain), and the emerging culture of chivalry,
 
all converged to produce the appropriate environment for
 
Urban's preaching of the ultimate Christian holy war in 1095
 
C.E.
 
The First Crusade (1095-1099 C.E.)
 
Karen Armstrong, in her work entitled Holy War. The
 
Crusades and Their Impact on Today's World, accurately
 
portrays the excesses of European militarism and its impact
 
on Islamic perceptions of western culture, including that of
 
Zionism. While it is entirely true that Zionism was
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regarded by the Palestine as just ehother
 
manifestation of European imperialism, Armstrong tends to
 
emphasize the excesses of the Crusades, painting them as ;
 
irrational wars of spiritual conquest. While she should be
 
applauded for applying holy war themes to the Christian
 
tradition, Armstrong's definition of holy war negates
 
rational intent and imputes a fanatical component to the
 
medieval Crusades. In actuality, rationality was always
 
the motivating factor in the implementation of holy war,
 
whether waged by Jews, Christians, or Muslims. The very
 
fact that theocracies must utilize relevant ideologies in
 
times of crisis necessitates the definition of holy war as a
 
rational concept, utilized by intelligent men. The
 
Crusades, then must be viewed through the eyes of political
 
and economic expediency in order to discuss their true
 
impact on European Christendom.
 
From the beginning, political and economic motives
 
lurked behind the decision to preach the First Crusade.
 
Urban, of course, was responding to Alexius Comnenus'
 
request for aid in the east; indeed, the idea of a unified :
 
Christian empire had not quite become extinct.. Politically,
 
defense of the Christian realm was a consideration.
 
Although relations with the Fatimids, who controlled access
 
to many of the holy sites of Palestine, were amiable.
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Turkish niigrations resulted in cohsiderable disruption of
 
the pilgrimage routes and interfered with the avenues of
 
trade that linked Europe with the Middle East. Thus,
 
economic concerns were prominent in the decision to
 
intervene militarily. Fatimid cooperation with Christian
 
interests was extensiye, effectively proving the weakness of
 
the religious motive so often associated with the Grusades.
 
Additionally, the chaotic state Of affairs in western Europe
 
With lords waging war against each other necessitated Some
 
policy by which the carnage and destruction could be
 
limited. Barring an act of God, the only reasonable . ,
 
solution seemed to be the removal of such elements from
 
society in the service of a cause deemed vital to the
 
survival of the Christian society. Finally, the base motive
 
of economic gain and plunder attracted the voracious
 
appetite of the western lords.
 
All of these themes: Byzantine vulnerability,
 
disruption of pilgrimage routes, feudal competition and
 
violence in Europe, and economic advantage, were essential
 
elements in Urban's address at Claremont. Of course,
 
racial invective and religious rhetoric were also part of
 
Urban's speech; however, these were techniques intended to
 
produce the desired result: a unified European army ready to
 
defend the interests of state. These interests, it must be
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 reiterated, were no different than those of any modern
 
state: political cohesion, social stability, economic
 
prosperity and territorial integrity. These are rational
 
objectives that the Church pursued as a self-perceived
 
theocratic institution of government. Other researchers
 
have clearly recognized this.^^® Although followers such as
 
Peter the Hermit were convinced of the holiness of their
 
mission, there remained a small core of leaders committed to
 
the achievement of specific objectives in the war effort.
 
For these men, fanciful ideas of holy war were subordinated
 
to the political and economic agenda; indeed, many of them
 
forged lasting ties with their Islamic adversaries once the
 
political realities of occupation became apparent. The
 
excesses of the CruSades, however, were severe. The
 
physical punishment of transport alone rendered many in the
 
army incapable of even a minimal humanity.^®® Unfortunately,
 
this has tended to place the Crusades in a particular
 
category of fanatical warfare. It is hopeful that the
 
actions that were the result of deprivation and very real
 
human suffering on the road to Jerusalem will someday be
 
balanced with a consideration of the state interests that
 
propelled the entire crusading effort.
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The Spcial Impact of the Crusades
 
As was mentioned before, the militant attitude of
 
Augustine's Christianity had found its counterpart earlier
 
in an evolving attitude concerning the efficacy of
 
martyrdom. Increasingly, Christians saw the "purgative"
 
qualities of suffering and began to apply it to those who
 
they perceived as needing it the most: heretics. As
 
Christian orthodoxy became ever more imperative in a
 
theocratic environment (at both the ecclesiastical,
 
imperial, and local level), stringent measures to enforce
 
the rightness of belief increased. The Crusading spirit was
 
effectively absorbed into the social environment of
 
Christendom, stressing the need for a "reformation of
 
life."^®^ By 1140, Gratian, in his Decretum (Quaestio 1),
 
asserted that Christian prerogatives for war were expressed
 
early on in the Gospels (Lk 3:14) As various problems
 
arose in the medieval Christian coJ^unity, heretics became
 
easy scapegoats for their non-^conformity, refusals to take
 
oaths, and hyper-ascetic lifestyles. It was not surprising,
 
then, that the instrument of crusade was turned against the
 
Albigensians in 1208 C.E.^®^ In a similar fashion to the
 
emergence of Judaic prophets after the establishemt of the
 
Israelite theocratic state, religious ideology (and its holy
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war component) in the Medieval Period became a social
 
phenomenon in Christendom. Each time this ideology was
 
transferred from the realm of the political state to the
 
social environment, the rational basis for its
 
implementation was somewhat diminished. That is to say,
 
popular culture would manipulate religious ideology in a
 
much more capricious, arbitrary manner. The believers, as
 
opposed to the designers of teligious ideology, were the
 
true fanatics. In this way, the multiplicity of religious
 
issues regarding orthodoxy that developed within Christian
 
society throughout the late medieval and Renaissance
 
periods, necessitating the emergence of Inquisitorial courts
 
and expanded ecclesiastical legal protections, can be seen
 
as aspects of a true religious war. As always, the
 
theocratic state found a way to institutionalize this,
 
mitigating the harsh realities of the Inquisition until the
 
spiritual rebellions of the Reformation.
 
Circumscribed aS it was by the Gospel of the first two
 
centuries, Christian holy war could only develop so far.
 
Unlike Judaic holy war, that had developed alongside
 
scripture, and the fluidity that would typify Islamic
 
perspectives concerning war, the Church was bound by the
 
sanctity it had imparted to the writings of a limited number
 
of apostles in the early Christian community. Constantihe
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pushed at the boundaries of the tradition that the Church
 
had received since apostolic times. Augustine introduced
 
innovative and controversial theoretical concepts into the
 
Christian vocabulary regarding the efficacy of war. Based
 
on these innovations (none of which were ever promulgated as
 
doctrines) many in the Church, from Charlemagne to Urban,
 
advocated an occasionally arbitrary reason for fighting.
 
Although there were some who espoused the more limited idea
 
of just war in a Christian society (a concept arguably
 
allowed by New Testament scripture), there were those who
 
ignored the practical reasoning of Urban, responding at
 
Claremont to the call to arms articulated by Augustine, "God
 
wills it!"
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CHAPTER THREE: THE THEOGRACY OF ISLAM
 
As the concept is understood by a very large sector of
 
the Muslim population throughout the world, jihad is a
 
defensive struggle ppssessed of two dimensions: spiritual
 
and political. By far the most noble expression of jihad is
 
found in the spiritual realm, as it encompasses the inner
 
struggle of humanity to overcome the oppression of sin and
 
the influence of evil in the world. This struggle is
 
perceived as essential to the purpose of every human being's
 
life: to draw ever closer to the compassionate embrace of
 
God. "Lesser jihad", on the other hand, involves the
 
political struggle for the survival of the Islamic community
 
in a world perceived as hostile to its existence.^®'' This
 
admittedly pessimistic view was indicative of the
 
competitive social environment of pre-Islamic Arab culture.
 
As a means of liberation from oppression, this view of jihad
 
is entirely reactive in the environment in which it
 
operates. This does not negate its nature as a product of
 
theocratic government; in fact, it may be observed that
 
jihad truly blossomed as an instrument of political ideology
 
subsequent to the time of Muhhamad's flight from Mecca and :
 
his eventual establishment of the Medinan umma, or Muslim
 
community, there. In the academic community, however.
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several equally inaccurate interpretations of jihad have
 
emerged.
 
Two of these prevailing views, orientalist and .
 
apologetic, respectively seek to portray Islam as either a
 
militaristic faith of prosyletization or a prophetic message
 
of supreme pacifism. The orientalist perspective,
 
promulgated by Western sources, is hampered by a notable
 
lack of objectivity. Indeed, until very recently, the very
 
idea of holy war was perceived in the west as having
 
originated exclusively in the Islamic tradition. This
 
approach, however, does not allow for consideration of both
 
the Deuteronomic and Augustinian models of warfare and their
 
impact on Muslim populations in the Middle East. While it
 
is true that social conditions in Pre-Islamic Arabia
 
necessitated a religious justification for war, Islam
 
(incumbent as it was to the Judaeo-Christian heritage for
 
various components of its theology) was influenced by the
 
theocratic glory of Jerusalem and the militant posture of
 
eastern Christians in defense of orthodoxy. Consequently,
 
even the apologist perspective fails as it is clear that
 
Islam espouses no such supreme pacifism.
 
To the contrary, Islam developed in a highly
 
competitive social environment that necessitated a mechanism
 
of political conflict-resolution. The surprising aspect of
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this mechanism, however, especially given the brutal
 
realities of pre-Islamic tribal culture that helped to
 
create it, is how moderate an ideological weapon it actually
 
was in the hands of the Prophet and his community.
 
Pertinent to any discussion of jihad and its early
 
application is the following criteria:
 
(1) Discussion of problems concerning Qur'anic
 
citation and interpretation.
 
(2) Consideration of the tribal conflicts that
 
typified pre-Islamic Arab culture and, to
 
some extent, influenced the development of
 
jihad. i
 
(3) Clarification of the origins of jihad (his
 
torically and Scripturally), observing the
 
development of theoretical models and the
 
applications of actual strategies in the
 
course of early Islamic history. This will
 
entail a discussion of how jihad developed
 
after the Aqaba Oath, Hijra (flight from
 
Mecca) and the establishment of the Medinan
 
Umma as a defensive strategy, in response to
 
perceived oppression under Quraysh hegemony.
 
Any exhortation to violence, it will be shown,
 
involved an implicit context of oppression,
 
tribal disunity or treason; in essence, it
 
always pursued an obvious and self-evident
 
political agenda.
 
Qur'anic Sources
 
The immediate problem concerning Qur'anic citation and
 
interpretation lies in translation. It has long been
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argued, quite convincingly, that the Qur'an, as a translated
 
document, is vastly inferior to its original renditions in
 
Arabic. In particular, English translations lack the
 
idioms, nuances, and meaningful inflections that enrich the
 
Qur'an in its inother tongue. Compounding the problem, many
 
western scholars have relied on translations that fit their
 
preconceptions of Islam, many of which are grounded in
 
empirical observation rather,than Scriptural analysis. That
 
is to say, rather than deriving a viable concept of jihad
 
from comprehensive Qur'anic texts, many have instead looked
 
to the past to see how Muslims themselves have corrupted the
 
ideal and applied this corruption to their translations of
 
the corresponding Qur'ahic verses, or ayats. This trend is
 
exemplified in N.J. Dawood's translation of the Qur'an,
 
especially when compared to the vastly superior work of
 
Mohammed Marmaduke Pickthall.
 
In the introduction to his translation, Dawood candidly
 
admits, "In adhering to a rigidly literal rendering of
 
Arabic idioms, previous translations have, in my opinion,
 
practically failed to convey both the meaning and the
 
rhetorical grandeur of the original."^" By whose criteria?
 
Ultimately, one must rely on Dawood's interpretation of
 
crucial ayats and the words he decides best convey their
 
purported meaning. Despite Dawood's assurance that he has
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 "taken pains to reproduce ...ambiguities wherever they occur
 
and...provided explanatory footnotes in order to avoid
 
turning the text into an interpretation", one is impressed
 
by the fact that, compared to Pickthall's translation,
 
Dawood's commentary is scant and the footnoting, in most
 
: places, relegated to a word or two. For these and other
 
reasons, Pickthall's translation is the preferred text.
 
There is an additional challenge in Qur'anic citation
 
,	 represented by the fact that orthodoxy in the early Islamic
 
community was maintained with some degree of fluidity. The
 
apocryphal story of Umar, as he attempted to contest the
 
orthodoxy of Hisam's Qur'anic recitations, is illustrative
 
of the utilitarian purpose with which even Muhammad regarded
 
his own revalations. This fluidity is not to be confused
 
with a casualness or disregard for truth; rather, it should
 
be acknowledged that the Prophet intended both an "exterior"
 
and an "interior" meaning for the content of his
 
revelation. The "interior" interpretations of Islam would
 
become especially relevant to Shi'ite Muslims.
 
Additionally, Hadith literature suggests that the Prophet
 
relied on spontaneous recollection in recovering much of the
 
oral recitation of the Qur'an.^''^ Of course, this was a
 
technique singularly reserved for the person of Muhammad and
 
only extended to the following generations of religious
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theorists in the collection of Hadith, not Scriptural
 
sources. This duality of meaning presents a problem for the
 
modern interpreter of the Qur'an, however, as the attempt to
 
restrict scriptural references to jihad to a single
 
interpretation fall short. Some argued (in later treatises)
 
that Hadith literature was the definitive source for the
 
interpretation of jihad; for these sources, scriptural
 
justification played only a minor role.' For all its
 
pretensions of objectivity, Dawood's translation itself
 
offers little in the way of alternative interpretations.
 
Pickthall, in his dedication to the original Arabic,
 
actually allows for a freer recitation of verses, and
 
consequently, the ease of use so desired by the Prophet.
 
This flexibility became a fundamental component of the
 
attempt to exploit the concept of jihad in an evolving
 
Islamic tradition that necessitated the development of an
 
offensive war strategy in the service of the theocratic
 
state.
 
Pre-Islamic Arabia
 
To demonstrate how jihad emerged as a defensive
 
strategy of Arab "real-politik", one must first cast a
 
glance backward into the pre-Islamic environment from which
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it sprang. Even Westei^n historians do not deny that
 
competition for natural and economic resources in Arabia has
 
always been fierce. A minor feature of this intensely
 
competitive environment, one that offered little other than
 
sport to the surrounding tribes competing for legitimacy and
 
status, was the razzia, or caravan raid.^^^ A far more
 
integral component of the pre-Islamic Arabian economy was
 
the establishment of urban cultic centers and pilgrimage
 
routes administered by the dominant tribal interests of any
 
given geographic location. This was certainly the case in
 
Mecca, as it was the nerve center of Quraysh economic
 
activity in western Arabia. It was thus the very survival
 
of the Quraysh tribe that Muhaiiimad threatened when he
 
directed his prophetic message toward Mecca, heaping scorn
 
on the pagan cults entertained there. The Quraysh
 
recognized the nature of this threat and took extreme
 
measures to ensure its timely demise. The enforcement of
 
traditional Meccan orthodoxy was pursued through a combined
 
mixture of harassment, religious ridicule, and economic
 
boycott of Muhammad's sympathizers.
 
Politically, tribal confederations were a source of
 
momentary power consolidation; more frequently, they
 
represented a divisive element in the Arabian Socio-

political environment as they rarely held together the
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 various economic interests involved. More often than not,
 
tribes would estabiish ttuces with one another on:^n ad-hoc
 
basis, breaking the terms Of such agrddments when their
 
economic interests dictated other courses of action.-^®
 
Jihad in the Time of the Prophet
 
Faced with violent opposition, boycott, and the
 
treacherous waters of tribal politics, it is hardly
 
suprising that Muhammad was preoccupied with issues of
 
conflict, political administration, and loyalty in his
 
prophetic message. It might even be said that Muhammad, in
 
the early days of Meccan opposition^ already perceived his
 
modest following to be under attack and, consequently, in a
 
state of war with Quraysh interests. Some have deduced from
 
this that Muhammad clearly favored all-out war rather than
 
the state of "permanent disunity" created by the fragmented
 
coalitions typical of Arabian politics."^ Despite these
 
reservations, it is entirely possible that Islamic
 
militarism was a logical development, given the conditions
 
of extreme persecution experienced by the Muslim population
 
of Mecca. •
 
It was under such pressure that the oath at Aqaba was
 
entered into, in 622 C.E., by parties loyal to the Prophet
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and by those who had requested his mediation in Yathrib
 
(Medina). Indeed, the Hijra (flight from Mecca) that
 
occurred later that same year, itself has been seen by some
 
as the first expression of the Aqaba ideal in a defensive
 
action against the Quraysh.^^® If this were so, then
 
Muhammad's subsequent use of the razzia against Quraysh
 
caravans merely represented another defensive tactic of war
 
against an aggressor. Still, little about the razzias
 
resembled a holy struggle; indeed, they assumed the minor
 
function of status competiton typical of the traditional
 
Arabian political and economic environment. Although much
 
has been made of Muhammad's interception of the caravan at
 
Nakhla, it seems little if any violence occurred as a result
 
of his decision to proceed with this policy. Those who
 
maintain that the Nakhla raid presaged a period of conquest
 
and aggressive conversion allow themselves to be swayed by
 
the history of subsequent dynasties in their assessment of
 
Muhammad's motives. Similarly, apologists find themselves
 
vulnerable to the charge that Muhammad was the supreme
 
pacifist. Indeed, many Qur'anic verses were "remembered" by
 
the Prophet precisely at this period in time, justifying
 
razzia activity during generally acknowledged sacred months
 
of the year. These verses, however, were arguably
 
intended to excuse the violation of tradition, not to preach
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the efficacy of holy war. Far more important for the
 
develdpmeht of a holy Wat ideal were the events surrounding
 
the battle of Badr, fought in 624
 
Some have maintained that the skirmish at Badr
 
represented an expression of s developing offensive
 
strategy. inclined to interpret the ongoing
 
struggle against the Quraysh as a de facto war, see Badr as
 
a response to Quraysh aggression. An alternate view regards
 
Badr as just another razzia gone awry."^ Despite these
 
differing interpretations of the event, one thing remains
 
clear: Muhammad and his followers won a convincing and
 
significant victory against overwhelming odds and they
 
attributed this to the intervention of God.
 
It is no coincidence, then, that the sanctification of
 
war in Islam occurred at precisely the moment when Muhammad
 
had established the first significant umma (Islamic
 
community) in Medina. Upon his arrival in Medina, Muhammad
 
had been hailed by Arab and Jew alike as a mediating
 
influence in the fierce tribal wars that had punctuated the
 
city's existence. Indeed, many had seen Islam as a unifying
 
ideal; one which could bring the disparate parties together
 
under a single political/religious banner.1®^ When the new
 
"ruling elite" was established in Medina, the foundations of
 
the first Islamic theocratic state were formed.
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This infant state had immediate internal problems to
 
attend to. Among the original Jewish tribes that had
 
welcomed the Prophet into the Medinan community, were those
 
who now recognized the glaring differences between Judaism
 
and Islam. These differences had, of course, been
 
exacerbated by Arabs still contemplating conversion to
 
Islam, only half weaned from the cultic practices of their
 
pagan heritage. Such Arabs prevailed upon Muhammad to
 
change the direction of prayer (Qiblah) from Jerusalem to
 
Mecca, thereby incurring the mistrust of the previously
 
complacent Jewish community. When several of the Jewish
 
tribes (the Qurayzah and Nadir) attempted to aid the Meccan
 
army during its siege of Medina (the Battle of the Trench)
 
in 627 C.E., Muhammad responded harshly
 
The Medinan umma and Jewish tribes both comprehended 
the ideological value of religion to the state; 
consequently, it was hardly surprising that Muhammad 
condemned the Nadir to exile and the Qurayzah to extinction ■ 
for their treason. These punishments, Draconian as they 
were, were prescribed by Judaic law itself and were in no 
way indicative of Islamic "fanaticism". Western assurances 
that Muhammad's treatment of the Jews was indicative of 
jihad theory (or even hostility to Judaism) fall short; the 
Prophet's actions reflected not so much the Islamic ethic of 
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war as they did traditional precepts of justice, and a
 
preoccupation with the political survival of the Islamic
 
. state.
 
Religion, however, was an acceptable and well-

understood concept of unitive ideology in Arabian politics,
 
tied as it was to the cultic economy of tribal interests;
 
and, after Badr, the idea of holy warfare increasingly
 
became an indispensible propagandistic tool in the pursuit
 
of the "pre-determined ends" of Islamic government. Despite
 
the religious propaganda of the emerging theocratic state,
 
the issues driving Islamic policies during this period were
 
as practical as any of the Modern Era. Despite the
 
prevailing view in the west that Arabia subsequently
 
succumbed to the sword of Islam, the evidence seems to
 
suggest that the Prophet's political prestige proceeded far
 
in advance of his religious reform.
 
After the Meccan refusal to finish the offensive at
 
Uhud (625 C.E.), the Ummayad general, Abu Sufyan, had become
 
increasingly suspicious of his own allies.1®® When the
 
battle of the Trench (a Quraysh offensive intended to crush
 
the infant Islamic state) resulted in the collapse of the
 
attacking army, Sufyan subsequently entered into secret
 
negotiations with Muhammad for the capitulation of Mecca.
 
Thus, the conquest of Mecca was accomplished without
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recourse to the sword. As Sufyan and the Quraysh elite
 
converted en masse to the religion of the Prophet, they were
 
increasingly rewarded with generous treatment and access to
 
power.
 
The mass conversion of the Quraysh to Islam was to
 
result in two significant developments in Islamic politics.
 
First, it effectively tied Quraysh interests and influence
 
irrevocably to Islamic policies. Second, it aroused the ire
 
of the Medinan population, among whom existed an
 
impoverished fighting class {ashab al-suffah). This class
 
depended, to a large extent, on confiscated booty for their
 
very survival and had anticipated, among other things, the
 
confiscation of Quraysh wealth. The practical effect of
 
Quraysh influence was to direct Ummayad expansion toward
 
mercantile centers, like Ta'if, vital to the Meccan
 
economy. The mounting prestige of figures like Sufyan (an
 
Umayyad) and Abu Bakr (a converted Ta'ifan bedouin) presaged
 
an imposition of parochial economic and political interests
 
upon the policies of Islamic government.
 
When expansion took place, it did so at the direction
 
of Meccan interests. The impact of the Medinan community
 
was such that it influenced only the direction in which that
 
expansion took place. As a concession to the economic
 
interests of the Medinan community (nominally responsible
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for the upkeep of the ashab al-suffah underclass), Muhammad
 
directed expeditions and raids into Byzantine territory to
 
the north (the Mutah campaign) in the hopes that Syrian
 
Arabs possessed the kind of moveable wealth so crucial to
 
his Medinan agenda. These raids, it should be noted, were
 
conspicuously lacking in religious exhortation. When these
 
raids failed to produce the expected economic benefits, the
 
Prophet, it is purported, devised the system of taxation
 
(repleat with Qur'anic revelation as justification) which
 
defined the Islamic relationship with its allies and
 
minority populations (the jizyah tax) Later forays, such
 
as the Tabuk campaign, were precipitated by Syrian and
 
Byzantine military threats, provoking a defensive response
 
from Mecca.
 
In short, by the time of Muhammad's supposed "conquest"
 
of Arabia, issues of war and peace were largely decided by
 
economic self-interest and political necessity, not
 
religious zeal or missionary fervor. If religion was the
 
deciding factor, why did interior tribes of the Najd and the
 
coastal regions (Yemen, Bahrayn and Oman) remain untouched?
 
While Islam appealed as a unifying principle to the
 
Medinans, it remained the task of the "ruling elite"
 
established by the Prophet to bring the remaining tribes
 
under their jurisdiction.
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War Policies of the Rashidun (623-661 C.E.)
 
Upon the death of Muhammad in 632, there was
 
considerable confusion in Mecca pertaining to the right of
 
succession.^®® The eventual election of Abu Bakr to the
 
Caliphate initiated the reign of the rashidun, considered by
 
Sunni Muslims to be the first four "rightly guided" rulers
 
of the Islamic state subsequent to the Prophet. According
 
to the Sunni tradition, Muhammad himself had left no clear
 
indication that he favored anyone for the position of
 
leadership in the Islamic state. Among the varying
 
interests competing for the Caliphate were the Muhajarun,
 
(these were the original Meccan followers of Muhammad who
 
followed him to Medina), the Ansar (the Medinan converts),
 
and the newly converted Quraysh in Mecca. Both Muhajarun
 
and Ansar distrusted one another, but not nearly as much as
 
they resented the power and influence wielded by those who
 
had so recently been their oppressors. Factions in the
 
Muhajarun camp either favored Abu Ubaydah (Umar ibn al­
Khattab's faction), Ali ibn Abi Talib (the Prophet's cousin)
 
or Abu Bakr.^®'' The Ansar clearly opposed the militaristic
 
agenda of the Meccans and would continue to do so under the
 
Caliphate of Abu Bakr (623-624 C.E.), gradually forming ties
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to the supporters of All.
 
Umar himself voiced criticism of the wars of the
 
Riddah, which effectively united the tribes of Arabia under
 
the banner of Islam. Additionally, several prominent
 
Umayyad leaders (Abu Sufyan and Khalid b. Sa'id) represented
 
Quraysh opposition to Abu Bakr. Nonetheless, Abu Bakr
 
enjoyed the powerful support of other members of the Quraysh
 
aristocracy, such as Khalid b. Al-Walid, Amr ibn Al-as,
 
Ikrimah ibn Abi Jahl, al-Ala ibn Al-Hadrami, and Yazid ibn
 
Abi Sufyan (the latter being the son of Abu Sufyan and
 
opposed to his preferences for Caliph) With such
 
support, and the eventual capitulation of Umar, Abu Bakr was
 
easily elected to the Caliphate and implemented a policy of
 
militarism unheard of in the Prophet's time.
 
Abu Bakr and the Wars of the Riddah
 
It has been acknowledged that the wars of the riddah
 
were attempts to consolidate the political power of the
 
Islamic state in Arabia.^®® They were necessary, from a
 
political perspective, because of the various opposition
 
movements that had emerged during Muhammad's rise to power.
 
In a similar phenomenon resembling that of the prophetic
 
expropriation of Judaic holy war themes during the divided
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kingdom (Chapter 2), Arab opponents of the Islamic state
 
masqueraded as prophets arguing their own rival
 
ideologies Not only did these opponents advocate
 
opposition, they preached open insurrection. The religious
 
exhortations of various "prophets" led to several
 
rebellions Thus, it seems, the theocratic ideology of
 
holy war, once codified and institutionalized by the state,
 
became an instrument of popular resistance and social
 
change. Of course, these movements gave Abu Bakr all the
 
justification he needed to proceed with a policy of
 
pacification. Muhammad's policy on militancy had moved
 
gradually from a policy of non-aggression to one which
 
allowed Muslims to respond militarily even in sacred months,
 
eventually proclaiming the state's right to war against
 
those opposing the poll tax levied on non-Muslims {jizyah).
 
Abu Bakr's position was a radical departure from orthodoxy
 
in that he favored a clear policy of expansion. It is clear
 
that he moved forcefully against the movements that opposed
 
him, including those that had not deemed it necessary to
 
object on religious grounds. In these cases, it seems,
 
Abu Bakr was engaged in a blatant grab for political power,
 
despite the questionable orthodoxy of his position.
 
Once the consolidation of power in Arabia was complete,
 
Abu Bakr cast his gaze on Syria to the north. It is a
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mistake to assume that Syria had always tempted the Muslims
 
from the time of the Prophet; it is far more likely that
 
Muhammad's ambitions in Syria never exceeded the bounds of
 
mere appeasment of the Medinan economy. The initial Mutah
 
campaign was ill-advised and intended only to bring back
 
enough material to fulfill his obligations to the ashab al­
suffah. Abu Bakr's appetite, however, was considerably
 
larger.
 
In a way, a Syrian campaign was unavoidable; since the
 
flurry of military activity surrounding Muhammad's rise to
 
power and the wars of the riddah, Byzantine interest had
 
been drawn south and imperial armies sent to protect
 
southern Palestine.^°^ In 630 C.E., the Byzantines had
 
recovered their Syrian lands from Sassanid control, although
 
the effort had depleted imperial coffers to the extent that
 
the armies of Constantinople would have been hard pressed to
 
respond to any major military crisis. Correspondingly,
 
Byzantine policy pursued a course of alliance building among
 
the Arab tribes of southern Syria, a development that
 
threatened the security of Medina and the bedouins to its
 
north. Abu Bakr recognized the clear danger to the
 
Islamic state that this policy represented and implemented a
 
systematic "raiding campaign" in Syria in the hopes that it
 
would prevent the northern tribes and imperial armies from
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unifying against hiiti.^°^ in another of a remarkable string
 
of improbable victories, the re-assigned general Khalid ibn
 
al-Walid defeated the Byzantine army at Ajnadayn in 634
 
C.E., thereby facilitating the expansion of Islam into
 
Palestine
 
Besides the obvious strategic reasons for a Syrian
 
campaign, there were other criteria that motivated Abu Bakr
 
to pursue his policy. First, the commercial contacts
 
maintained between Meccan and Syrian merchants, and their
 
respective markets, were extensive.^"® Also, there were
 
political advantages to be gained in Palestine by a policy
 
of conquest; specifically, the extension of an Islamic
 
system of tribal alliances that would effectively counter
 
the influence of Constantinople
 
Several key elements, however, offered Abu Bakr the
 
chance to characterize this conflict as a holy war.
 
Predominant among these elements was the concept of an
 
Islamic presence in Al-Quds, or Jerusalem. Given the
 
prominence of Jerusalem in Islamic worship (due to a
 
perceived shared history with the Judaic tradition), this
 
seemed to be a religious ideal and, indeed, Abu Bakr used it
 
as such in his attempt to unify the Arab armies. Even in
 
the case of Jerusalem, however, there was a political
 
purpose to Abu Bakr's agenda. If one understands religion
 
116
 
to be an ideology of the theocratic state, then it follows,
 
that whatever strengthens that ideology also improves the
 
stability of the state. Muhammad had clearly impressed upon
 
the Arab population its historical ties to the geneology and
 
faith of Abraham. In this regard, Jerusalem was as
 
important an element of Islamic ideology as the concept of
 
one God; indeed, Jerusalem indicated the historical presence
 
of Allah in a community that had worshipped him long before
 
the advent of His latest prophet. It also invoked the
 
political idea of Davidic theocracy, a concept of supreme
 
utilitarian advantage to Muhammad. An Islamic presence in
 
this holy city could only reinforce the ideology that
 
supported the Caliph's government and present the Arabs with
 
a "manifest destiny", of sorts, in their efforts to expand
 
geographically.
 
Another element in the development of the Syrian
 
campaign as a holy struggle was the figure of Khalid ibn al-

Walid himself. In the years directly preceding the Syrian
 
campaign, Khalid had worked extensively to consolidate
 
Islamic rule among the Arab tribes on the Iraqi border.
 
At times, his mission sent him across Sassanid borders as he
 
sought to elist the loyalties of Arabs settled on the right
 
bank of the Euphrates River. Khalid's actions resulted in
 
Persian antagonism, but the ideology of Islam was an
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efficient means of unifying these Arabs against Persian
 
domination. The ensuing struggle against the Sassanids and,
 
consequently, Khalid's own person, acquired and sustained an
 
aura of "holiness". Upon Khalid's arrival in Syria, it was
 
a simple task for Abu Bakr to transfer this sense of a holy
 
mission to the general's campaign against the Byzantines.
 
Thus, in the Syrian expansion of Islam, despite its
 
political and economic basis, military aggression was
 
regarded in the popular vocabulary as a war for the glory of
 
God.-'^- ■ 
Expansion into Mesopotamia (modern day Iraq) was also
 
inspired by recognizable political and economic issues. The
 
obvious threat of Sassanid invasion in the east (despite the
 
weakened condition of the Persian army) necessitated a
 
political presence there. The extension of tribal alliances
 
and levying of taxes were another motivating factor. The
 
profound economic significance of Mesopotamiann agricultural
 
regions was not lost upon the Islamic leadership (now
 
exerted by Umar ibn al-Kkattab after Abu Bakr's death in
 
634), and the victories at al-Qadisiyyah and Jalula in 637
 
C.E. ushered in an era of Islamic hegemony in Iraq.^"
 
Similar patterns of expansion, based on political and
 
economic expediency, were followed in the subsequent
 
invasions of Iran, Egypt, North Africa, and Spain.
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All too often, In the west, these campaigns have been
 
interpreted as expressions of jihad, because their Isiamic
 
practioners availed themselves of the theocratic ideology of
 
religion as a unifying principle and attracted converts
 
along the way. It should be noted, that jihad was a
 
Qur'anic concept of limited aggression, utilized in defense
 
of the community and regulated by interpretation of Hadith.
 
"Holy war", on the other hand, was a political instrument,
 
soon to be a social institution, its practitioners
 
expropriating jihad theory for the implementation of and as
 
a justification for political violence and expansion.-"'' In
 
this sense, "holy war" did not fit the preconditions for
 
jihad, nor did it strictly adhere to the understanding of
 
the non-Islamic world as "the abode of war" (dar al-harb).
 
The interpretation of harb as either "war" or "unrest"
 
leaves open the possibility that peoples unapproached by
 
Islam simply lacked the spiritual "peace" accomplished
 
through submission to Allah. "Holy War", as a mutant
 
aberration of Qur'anic jihad, actually achieved the more
 
uninspired distinction of qital, or petty fighting. It has
 
long been suspected by mainstream Sunni Muslims that
 
Qur'anic citation itself could have been tainted by the
 
influence of later political figures. , Considerable debate
 
continues to this day concerning the alleged "insertion" of
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Qur'anic texts that support one sectariaU grdup over
 
anottier.^^®
 
Thus, it shpuid come as no surpri^ policies
 
of itbu Bakr, once initiated/ were pursued with renewed vigor
 
and determination by succeeding Caliphs. Umar oversaw the
 
consoiidation of isiamic; power ^ in Syria and Iraq,, as Khaiid
 
won decisive batties at Damascus (635 C.E.) and Yarmuk (637
 
G.E.), The Sas$anid capitol at Ctesiphon succuinbed to the
 
invading Islamic: armies in 637 e.E., and, Jerusalem fell in
 
■folidwing:year. Exerting Islamic military power in 
another ecohomically}vital region, J^r ibn al^As led his 
armies into Egypt,: conquering Pelusium., Heliopolis/ Babylon, 
and Alexandria between the years 639 and 642 C.E 
The election of UthmanibnAffan to the Caliphate, in 
644, signalled the rise of the Umayyad family and a period 
of intense conflict in Islamic politics. Although Uthman, 
third Caliph of the rashidun, was largely pre-occupied with 
political administration and consolidation of Islamic power 
in the new provinces, his supposed reversion to traditional 
familial politics and favoritism resulted in his 
assassination in 656. The short lived Caliphate of Ali, 
cherished by those who considered blood lines to the Prophet 
to be paramount, resulted in little but further animosity 
between Umayyad and Muhajarun interests. Despite efforts at 
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negotiation and an eventual stalemate at Siffin in 657, Ali
 
refused to punish the murderers of Uthman and was himself
 
assassinated by a disaffected Kufan in 661.^^® A subsequent
 
agreement with Ali's son, Hasan, allowed Muawiyah ibn Abu
 
Sufyan (Uthman's cousin) to re-establish Umayyad control
 
over the Caliphate.
 
Umayyad Expansion (661-750 C.E.)
 
Once elevated to the Caliphate (in 661 C.E.), Muawiyah,
 
who shifted the political administration of the growing
 
Islamic empire to Damascus, embarked upon an ambitious
 
campaign that included: (1) a renewed attack upon Byzantium,
 
(2) a policy of westward expansion that focused on North
 
Africa and Spain, and (3) a policy of eastward expansion
 
that focused on India and China. Although these campaigns
 
extended the hegemony of the faith, conversion was, as
 
always, non-compulsory. The option afforded unbelievers
 
opposed to conversion was the imposition of the jizya^ or
 
poll tax, as a means of support for the political
 
administration of the Islamic state. This and the
 
unrelenting moderation with which the Jewish and Christian
 
minority populations were treated by the invading armies of
 
Islam demonstrate the political and economic agendas that
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 drove Islamic expansionist policy forward.
 
^ War" was occasiohaliy preached in the
 
heat of expansion, the religion of sound political
 
administration was more frequently practiced. Thus/ the
 
issuers that ocGupied the attentions of Muawiyah were those
 
of "political and military affairs; tax collection; and
 
religious administration/ including courts and
 
endowments."221 Legal and judicial reform often took the
 
guise of religious reform, especially given the nature of
 
theocratic government (that is, the derivation of law from
 
spiritual sources). An example of this was evident in
 
Ziyad's (Muawiyah's half-brother) speech to his constituents
 
in Basrah where he effectively wove the themes of God and
 
respect for the law into a powerful diatribe against
 
lawlessness.--­
The single greatest effect Muawiyah had upon
 
perceptions of conflict within the Islamic community,
 
however, was in the appointment of his son, Yazid, as
 
successor to the Caliphate. This set into motion a chain of
 
events that would result in a centuries long debate
 
concerning the legitimacy of Islamic leadership. Central to
 
this conflict was the concept of martyrdom.
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A Brief Analysis of Martyrdom
 
Certainly, Muslims had witnessed the example of
 
martyrdom from their Christian brethren; the model of the
 
"soldier of Christ" defending Byzantine interests was well
 
impressed on the collective consciousness of Islam. Despite
 
this, martyrdom has often been associated with the concept
 
of fanaticism in western secular thought. It was and is,
 
however, an element of warfare no more dangerous than that
 
of the decorated veteran acknowledged for his bravery and
 
self-sacrifice in the field of battle. What is the
 
difference between the Muslim who is convinced that his
 
conduct in war will win for him a special reward in heaven
 
and the patriotic soldier who, for love of God and country,
 
throws himself on a live grenade in an attempt to save his
 
companions? In fact, nothing distinguishes the two acts
 
save ideology. As an ideology of the theocratic state,
 
religion reduces the components of heroism to the concept of
 
martyrdom and utilizes it as a model for exemplary conduct
 
in war.
 
The difference lies in the conceptual definition of
 
martyrdom, not so much in its application in war. As in
 
martyrdom, the emotional component of heroism is much more
 
dynamic than its theoretical expression. Thus, while it is
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certainly true that the Qur'an articulated a cohesive theory
 
of martyrdom for the Islamic armies of the rashidun, it
 
would not be until the later events of the civil war that
 
the intense emotions associated with its applications in war
 
would assume mythic proportions. After the attempt of
 
Husayn (Hasan's brother) to challenge Yazid for the
 
Caliphate, and the massacre of his forces at Karbala in 680
 
C.E., the Shi'at All (party of Ali) embued their struggle
 
with the ethic of martyrdom, far surpassing the traditional
 
Sunni understanding of the concept.
 
Following the death of Yazid (683), the Umayyad dynasty
 
entered into a state of stagnation and eventual decline. No
 
less than twelve Umayyad Caliphs reigned in a period of
 
sixty-seven years; no more than three (abd al-Malik, al-

Walid I, and Hisham) ever retained the office for more than
 
four years. In 747 C.E., various groups opposed to
 
Umayyad rule banded together with the descendants of al-

Abbas and challenged the ruling elite for the Caliphate. In
 
this way, the focus of power shifted from Damascus to
 
Baghdad,
 
Abbasid "Jihad"
 
Precipitating the Abbasid revolt against the Umayyads
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 in 747 C.E., there was general unrest and dissatisfaction in
 
the Islamic world regarding the policies of the Caliphate.
 
The Kharagites Of Khufa dissented based;on issues ;involving:
 
strict dbservance of the ;Qur'an.^^^ Many Muslims objected^ t
 
corruptioh:at the ^ highest: levels:of Umayyad administration
 
and disagreed on fundamental religious issues such aa
 
justification by faith and the efficacy of good works.
 
criticism of the Caliphate mounted, the Abbasids joined the
 
Chorusgof dissent;, -accusing the Caliphate of "betraying the
 
real Islam". These calls for religious reform were, to a
 
large extent, also; indicative,,of.va, political-

dissatisfaction. .. A:;finahCia1, crisis, it seems,,- : iad, ^
 
plagued the Caliphate of Hisham abd al-Malik (724t743 C.E.)
 
and hampered the central administration's ability to
 
, effectively govern the frontiers
 
Additionally, there were concerns that the Umayyads had
 
increasingly favored Arab constituencies in an expanded
 
empire that included, among others, Greek, Persian, Indian,
 
Egyptian and Berber populations.'^® Even among Arabs,
 
support seemed to be waning; after the Caliphates of Abd al-

Malik and al-Walid I (under whom Umayyad armies had ,
 
conquered Algeria, Morocco and parts of Spain), Islamic
 
expansion slowed considerably, leaving Arab trading
 
interests dissatisfied.^^® Umayyad interests could have
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potentially appealed to one sector of the population against
 
the agendas of the others, so an effective ideology for the
 
opposition movement now coalesced under Abbasid control.
 
Perhaps this was why the Abbasids turned to the one
 
available source that offered them an ideology from which
 
they could "de-legitimize" Umayyad authority: Islam.
 
The religious argument apparently worked; in 750 C.E.,
 
the first Abbasid Caliph ruled from Baghdad. A clear
 
indication that religion facilitated the implementation of
 
an Abbasid political agenda was demonstrated by the fate of
 
the Shi'i general, Abu-Muslim, who was executed for
 
"heresy", despite his contributions to the Abbasid cause.
 
Although Abbasid interests wooed Shi'i support with promises
 
of power, once the Umayyads were defeated Abu-Muslim was
 
seen as too great a threat and quickly eliminated. The
 
pretense of "heresy" simply illustrated the Abbasid
 
inclination toward opportunism. Similarly, the subsequent
 
liquidation of all Umayyads under Abbasid rule demonstrated
 
the new regime's utter disregard of Qur'anic prohibitions
 
regarding inter-Islamic conflicts
 
Despite the Abbasid reliance on religion as an ideology
 
of rebellion, the new dynasty was typified by a general lack
 
of expansionist policy and military ambition. Perhaps
 
this was because of the fragmented state of the Islamic
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conraiunity itself* Clearly sectarian,differences iiad
 
increased since the unfortunate inteflude at Karbala, in 6§:0
 
C.E.; now political administration of the:Islamic empire
 
seemed almost impossible. Faced with political pressure
 
from Shi'is and isma'ills, (a Shi'i splinter group who
 
regarded Isma'il's son Muhammad as the seventh imam), the
 
focus of Abbasid government shifted from militarism to the
 
establishment of theological schools and an expression of
 
Islamic art and philosophy This was done in effort to
 
create a mainstream Islamic culture that could effectively :
 
marginalize the influence of the "heretical" cults; over
 
time, this strategy was largely successful. For the moment,
 
the Abbasids were less able to prevent the expropriation of
 
religious ideology by their enemies.
 
Political Upheaval in the Abbasid Empire (762-945 C.E.)
 
As the Islamic empire expanded and then stagnated,
 
various groups seeking the opportunity to create local
 
hegemonies emerged, utilizing the ideology of religion as a
 
unifying "nationalism". Shi'ite partisans staged a
 
rebellion in Mecca and Basra in 762, followed by an uprising
 
in Morocco by Shi'i led Berbers in 788. Similarly,
 
followers of Zayd, All's grandson, fermented unrest in
 
127
 
TabaristaTi and Yemen. In the;mid^n±nth; century C.E.,
 
Ismai'Ii opposition in Bahrain took shape in the form of a
 
Qarmation independence movement."^® An aura of religious
 
charisma, approaching the political nature of a "cult of/
 
personality", surrounded the leader of the Qarmatidns In
 
addition to Bahrain, Ismal'ills maintaihed a strong presence
 
in both Arabia and Syria, continuing political opposition to
 
Sunni leadership well into the Modern Era. Similarly, the
 
Zanj rebellion in lower Iraq (a component of the Samanid
 
movement, 819-1005) featured eharismatic figures (al-Husayn
 
and al-Khujustani) who were jailed for "using the pulpits of
 
Khurasan to exhort the population to give allegiance to
 
Muhammad b. Tahir.""-''
 
Particularly in the eastern provinces, ruling elites
 
replaced one another with astonishing rapidity. By 873, the
 
Taharid government of Sijistan was removed by its Saffarid
 
successors In the tenth century C.E., Ismail'is in
 
Tunis and Egypt rebelled against Sunni leadership, resulting
 
in the establishment of a Fatimid dynasty (909-1171 C.E.)
 
that would eventually encompass parts of Syria and
 
Palestine Consequently, the political situation of the
 
Abbasids, from the ninth century on, was dire; in fact, the
 
empire was in a state of absolute chaos, culminating in the
 
fall of Baghdad to the Shi'ite Buyids in 945.^''  In many
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places, Abbasid control was only nominal; the jurisdiction
 
of the local dynasty took precedence over imperial ,
 
dbjectives.^''^ Despite the commotion caused by a
 
plethora of local disturbances, uprisings, and dynastic
 
changes, nothing shook the JUDbasid government down to its
 
very core as effectively as the arrival of the Turks.
 
The Ghazan Turks and the "Dar al-Harb"
 
Originally from the borders of central Asia, the
 
nomadic pastoral tribes that comprised the Turkish ethnic
 
unit, initially came into contact with the Abbasid Empire in
 
the ninth century Surely, various Turkish groups had
 
converted to Islam even as far back as during the Umayyad
 
period, but it would be on Abbasid administrations that they
 
exerted the strongest influence. Initially, there was
 
intense conflict, between the various Islamic dynasties that
 
had achieved a great degree of political, philosophical and
 
artistic sophistication and these rough, impulsive nomads
 
from the northeast Gradually, as Turks were captured in
 
battle and tribute was taken in the form of child labor, a
 
generation of indoctrinated youth, taught in the ways of
 
Islam, emerged as a powerful influence in Turkish culture.
 
These new converts to Islam were utilized by the government
 
129
 
as "border soldiers", or ghazis, in the effort to create a
 
buffer zone between the Mjbasids and the still uhcb
 
Turkish tribes. Serving aS they were in the army of
 
Islam, these ghazis aGcepted the theocratic ideology of :
 
religion as it had developed in its purest fdrm; riamely, as;
 
a justification for the expansion and defense of Islam.
 
This made obYious sense to. thP^f for theirs was a culture
 
■ defending. Islamic . . 
centered about the reality of conflict and war.
 
.Increasingly, however,: as the,, task ef 

borders against pagan Turks became ever more crucial, a
 
ghazah:"us and thein": inentality began to develop.:
 
From tfe beginning, Islam, had always.; incorporated the
 
ideas of a "Dar al^islam" (abode of peace) and a "Dar :al*-

Harb" (abode;Of cdnflict).i:Nbrmel they had referred^ :t
 
the locations where the peace of God had been established
 
and those where confusion and ignorance still reigned. Now,
 
as ghazan Turks struggled to defend the borders of the "Dar
 
al-Islam", it was easy to characterize the "Dar al-Harb" as
 
a place where war must be waged in order to establish peace.
 
As the militarism of ghazis increased, so their reliance on
 
Islamic religious ideology as a unitive element intensified,
 
resulting in a rearticulation of "Dar al-Harb" as the "abode
 
of war" peopled by unbelievers This had certainly been
 
the understanding of the non-Islamic world in centuries
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past, but never with the same implications of organized
 
militarism.
 
The Seljuk Turks, converted in 960, were indespensible
 
to the ghazis in the struggle for the border; consequently,
 
they modeled their concepts of war based upon ghazan
 
doctrines. By 1040, Seljuks had conquered Khurisan; in
 
1055, they sacked Baghdad and in short measure, they
 
acquired Azerbaijan, Armenia arid Anatolia (after the battle
 
of Manzikert in 1071) These campaigns often took on the
 
aspect of a holy struggle, particularly those against the
 
Byzantines of Anatolia. Holy war, as opposed to the
 
original concept of jihad, had now become an unabashedly
 
offensive strategy, wielded by a non-Arab power determined
 
to expand geographically. In a way, the Seljuks resembled
 
the Caliphs of the Rashidun and Umayyad dynasties as they
 
tirelessly availed themselves of religious ideology in
 
pursuit of economic and geographic integrity, despite
 
Qur'anic regulations to the contrary.
 
This Seljuk domination Would help to further
 
institutionalize the idea of holy war as a concept eternally
 
consistent with the ends of Islamic government. The
 
establishment of madrasas (religious schools) as
 
institutions of the state in which war propaganda was
 
disseminated typified Turkish administration of the Islamic
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uima.^^° These schobis would becoirie the instrumeri| of ;;
 
leaders such as Nur al-bin JVrslan Shah, or; Nureddin,
 
/r.1193^1211 GvE.l Whp;elaborated upon the idea ofV holy war
 
as a "complete theory, sketching out a precise political
 
path" for Islam.^^^ Motivated by obvious political niotiyes,
 
such as the exertion of his own influence upon the Abbasid
 
Caliphate, the capture of Damascus and the re-union of Mosul
 
and Aleppo, Nureddin refined the art of holy war to the
 
level it enjoys in the Modern Era as an ideology for various
 
political extremist groups. Thus it was that, in addition
 
to his titles as "guardian of Allah's land" and "conqueror
 
of infidels and pagans", it could be said of Nureddin by his
 
"Whi1e a11 the other sovereigns .think of
 
nothingbut their empty worldly goods,
 
you [Nureddin] dedicate yourself to the
 
defense of religion"
 
As much could be said of his resolve to defend the Islamic
 
state. T ­
The institution of the masdrasas facilitated the easy
 
dissemination of war rhetoric by succeeding dynasties, v
 
Salah al-Din Yusuf ibn Ayyub, or Saladin (1169-93 C.E.)/
 
perhaps the most stereotyped figure in Islamic history,
 
became the inheritor of Nureddin's revival of holy war
 
themes. His success, coupled with the fall of
 
Constantinople in 1453 to Mehmed the Conqueror, was
 
instrumental in the negative view that has prevailed in the
 
West regarding the Turks. The period of Ottoman expansion
 
tljiat followed the Crusades only reinforced western views on
 
the militancy of Islam; despite the socio-religious
 
consciousness of the millet system that it introduced. It
 
is a sad legacy that the fanaticism attributed to Islam was
 
largely the product of the early conquests and the inability
 
of the West to cope with the success of Turkish foreign
 
policy.
 
Thus, it is clear that that apart from the theoretical
 
development of jihad there existed an understanding of holy
 
war themes in Islamic culture. These themes often strayed
 
from the profound practicality of the Prophet who saw
 
survival as the sole justification for his limited
 
militarism. As the theory of jihad became the expedient
 
instrument with which to pursue economic and geographic
 
expansion for the Islamic theocratic state, holy wars were
 
regularly preached. It should be noted, that the frequency
 
of holy war exhortation increased with the development of
 
theocratic institutions in Islamic culture. This was due
 
largely to the increased pressures of political and economic
 
competition among various states in the Middle East and the
 
advent of European interests in the region;. "Survival" was
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translate<i iiitd eqonomi^^ and political terms; consaquently,
 
holy war became effectively institutionalized by government
 
interests. By strange coineidence, Islaniic jihad
 
was liberated from its Qur'anic limitations and inserted
 
into the realities of imperial policy and expansionism. In
 
this way, "holy war" became an image of jihad magnified by
 
the successes of theocratic Islam.
 
■ ■ I 
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CONCLUSION
 
Throughout history, societies have wrestied with issues
 
of conflict resolution. Political and economic agendas have
 
determined how these societies pursued specific policies
 
that pcbasionally breached the rights and obligations of
 
other polities. When the normal procedures for negotiating
 
disintegrated, war became, to paraphrase Isaac Asimov, the
 
"last refuge" of the incompetent. At the same time, the
 
formulation of society has remained, for the most part, an
 
unconscious process. No one (save the behavioralists of the
 
modern era) has attempted to consciously construct a
 
community with pre-conceived or fabricated norms and values.
 
In this regard, societies that have evolved into theocracies
 
have possessed their own particular strategic perspectives
 
in pursuit of the political and economic agendas essential
 
to survival. Thus, when efforts to negotiate failed and war
 
ensued, theocracies utilized the ideology that formed the
 
very basis of their social system in order,to foster a sense
 
of cultural unity and "national" purpose.
 
As explained in my introduction, I use the term
 
"nation" to define a society possessed of the following
 
characteristics:
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 (1) A highly centralized government,
 
(2) a bureaucratic administration,
 
(3) well defined geographic borders,
 
(4) a complex economic system,
 
(5) long distance trade, and
 
(6) a state i
 
All of these characteristics typified some ancient societies
 
and, I believe, qualified them as nations. Theocratic
 
nations utilized religion as an ideology with as much
 
effectiveness as modern states pursue the ideals of
 
democracy, Marxism or absolutism. Democracy is a political
 
system, Marxism an economic theory, absolutism a cultural
 
norm. All have become state ideologies, however, and have
 
developed a mythic history that borders on the religious.
 
Pericles and the golden age of Athenian democracy still
 
inspire many in the west with a religious devotion. The
 
Marxist heroes of the past, until very recently, occupied
 
their place in a community of saints whose earthly remains
 
were venerated in communist capitols everywhere. Third
 
world dictators are parental symbols in societies where
 
obedience to authority is fearfully observed with a : i
 
dedication usually reserved for father-god figures. In what
 
way, then, may the theocratic ideology of religion be 
. regarded as anything different? 
■ ■■ The reasons for waging war in the modern era have , 
seemed apparent. The rhetoric sounds reasonable, precisely 
because Sll are children of a particular ideology that :
 
defines social purpose. The. First Wptld'%r^wad f
 
"make the world safe for democracy". Westward expansion In
 
the United States, and its devasta:ting impact:oh native
 
populations, was an essential component of "manifest
 
destiny". The monstrous policies of Josef Stalin were
 
intended to develop Russia as an industrialized economy (a ^
 
necessary prefequiSite for Mafxist ideoiogy). : To the casual
 
observer, the ideologies of democracy and Marxism might be
 
regarded as having exercised a type of fanaticism in pursuit
 
of their agendas. How and why did religion become the
 
scapegoat for the fanaticism typical of many ideologies?
 
Perhaps it is because religion is more effective than
 
political/economic ideologies at convincing people to make
 
commitments to the ideological agenda; especially those that
 
entail sacrifice of life and limb. All other ideologies are
 
bound to the here and now, the physical plane that
 
determines existence. Only religion can offer the hope of
 
eterna1 reward and the solace of God's approval, but how
 
much more fanatical is this concept than the typical - ; ;
 
American's faith in the U.S. Constitution? In a way,
 
religion• is^the ultimate state ideology. ^ History has indeed
 
proved the efficacy of religious ideology as a instrument of
 
f theocratic'rhetoric, especially in times of war.
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 ^ a concept that sought to 
reinterpret the past in such a way that it would inspire 
courage and conviction in crisis. It developed in times of 
extreme disunity, never fully realizing its potential as an 
ideology. Judaic holy war was almost entirely conceptual; 
the troubled monarchies that sought to utilize its value 
never achieved the unity of purpose they so desperately 
desired. As a conceptual device, however, it had fewer 
restrictions placed on its definitions or applications. God 
had promised the land of Canaan to the Israelites; it was 
the mission of every one of the faithful to kill, if 
necessary, to keep it. ■The deaths at Masada stand as a grim 
reminder of the legacy of Jewish nationalism. Judaic ' 
scripture was produced concurrent to the trends in 
theocratic ideology, mirroring and accentuating the themes 
of holy war and nationalism. 
Christian holy war developed only after a body of 
scripture had been established. Because of this fact, 
Christian warfare was significantly restricted by the . 
ambiguous statements attributed to Jesus. This did not 
prevent religious and secular leaders in Christian society 
from developing realistic strategies consistent with the 
ends of theocratic government. The loyalty professed by 
Roman Christians to the Empire of Constantino, the , 
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inndVatioilS of Augustine articulated two theories of
 
Christian warfare), as well as the expansionist policies of
 
Charlemagne, clearly illustrate this point. That is not say
 
that war waged by the Christian church was lacking in
 
scriptural authority. Certainly, even the Crusades
 
initially possessed an element of Christian self-sacrifice
 
in the call to arms in defence of the Byzantines. Although
 
"the crusades were arguably justifiable from a scriptural .
 
point of view, nothing could have vindicated the outcome.
 
In the end, political/economic issues (the cessation of
 
warring between western lords and the confiscation of booty)
 
served as more compelling reasons to fight. It is perhaps
 
fortunate that, although none of Augustine's theories ever
 
achieved the status of doctrine, the clearest Christian
 
traditions acknowledging the possibility of Christian war
 
reflect his more moderate just war principle and eschew the
 
idea of war "at God's bidding". This, of course, may be due
 
to the sobering realities of crusading and the diminishing
 
idealism that followed. ;
 
As a faith that stemmed from the revelations of one
 
man, Islam enjoyed a flexibility without parallel in the
 
: Judaic or Christian tradition. Despite this, Qur'anic
 
sources have imposed a greater number of restrictions on the
 
waging of war than any of the other two monotheistic faiths.
 
Although Judaic holy war has had only limited historical
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appliea,tion, theoretically it is unconstrained by
 
restrictions. The-Christian church, though it now
 
acknowledges only one legitimate reason for war (i.e.
 
fulfillment of the just war conditions), has occasionally
 
allowed Augustine's less restrictive holy war theories to
 
prevail.
 
Due to the harsh realities of survival that faced the
 
early Islamic community, Muhammad was determined that
 
politically feasible, yet ethically defensible, model for
 
Islamic war be constructed. This meant that he could employ
 
fluid methods in his recollection of Qur'anic revelation,
 
but also, that after each recollection the revelation became
 
more precise. Thus, although it is possible to trace a
 
development in the Prophet's own thinking concerning Islamic
 
war, by the time of his death, the limitation of,Jihad was a
 
clearly established concept in scripture. Orthodoxy among
 
mainstream sunni Muslims still requires that defensive
 
requirements be met, or that issues vital to the survival of
 
the Islamic community (treason, non-compliance with
 
taxation, and despotism) should be addressed in the
 
application of jihad. Holy war, on the other hand, was
 
developed as a political instrument throughout Islamic
 
history, its practioners seeking to expropriate jihad
 
rhetoric but ignoring the scriptural justifications for its
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existence. Because of the competitive environment in which
 
Islamic political independence grew, arid the increasingly
 
hostile reaction directed toward Islam from the West, the
 
causes for war are perhaps more imminent in the Arab world
 
than anywhere else. In this regard, holy war could hardly
 
have retained the limited definition of jihad for very long.
 
Holy war is with us today. As the political center
 
evaporates, extremism avails itself of the spiritual
 
absolutism of religious ideology. The modern state of
 
Israel (whose established borders were determined by Ben-

Gurion using Biblical criteria) represents nothing less than
 
a modern example of theocratic government in operation. The
 
claim to the land of Canaan by modern Israelis is still
 
based on divine covenant. Similarly, so-called Christian
 
militias and political activists rally around the concept of
 
holy war in their respective struggles (witness the
 
religious rhetoric used to mask the political issues in
 
Northern Ireland). Extremist groups, as apparent as their
 
political agendas are, still use religious ideology as a
 
unitive force in an environment of ethnically fractured
 
Islamic revival. Despite Sunni and Shi'i, Persian and Arab,
 
North African and Asian cultural differences. Islamic
 
revival remains an ethical challenge to assimilationist
 
governments throughout the Muslim world. Politically, it is
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perhaps the only hope for constituencies historically
 
oppressed both by domestic and foreign enemies.
 
Despite the chauvinism of Twentieth Century theorists, ;
 
it remains a sad fact that the modern age will be remembered
 
not only for its accomplishments, but for its brutality.
 
Recent studies have noted the rise in torture as a political
 
technique and ethnic rivalries in Boznia-Herzogovina have
 
illustrated the durability of.ancient conflicts. Religious
 
ideology, with its holy war propaganda, should be placed in
 
its proper context alongside political and economic
 
ideologies as a force that has been implemented throughout
 
history with realistic and practical objectives in mind. As
 
social movements inherited holy war themes from traditions
 
that had been founded on theocratic principles, religious
 
ideology became ever more entrenched. Perhaps this has been
 
interpreted as fanaticism. It is more probable that
 
fanaticism exists as a universal human characteristic that
 
lays dormant until the confluence of human events demands
 
action. The survival of any human community depends on the
 
emotional investment of its members. When that survival is
 
threatened, humans will fight desperately for the
 
continuation of a society in which they derive meaning.
 
Whether the meaning is political, economic, or religious,
 
matters little. They will determine the efficacy of their
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struggle based on their respective traditions. They will
 
fight the holy war.
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Then the army {parembole) moved and encamped to the south
 
of Emmaus. Judas encouraged his army, saying, "Gird
 
yourselves like brave men...it is better for us to die in
 
battle than to look upon the tragedies of our nation and our
 
sanctuary. But whatever be the will in Heaven, thus shall
 
he do".
 
90. Mendels, p.124.
 
91. Johnson, p.105.
 
92. Mendels, p.199.
 
93. Mendels, p.192, delineates the difference between
 
religious/cultural and political domination:
 
Moreover, during the time under discussion Rome had no
 
intention of uprooting the national identities of the
 
peoples that it found in the East. Rome let them go on
 
living their daily lives, but exploited them economically
 
dominated them politically...Therefore the indigenous
 
populations continued to hold onto many of their : /
 
nationalistic traits such as language, temple territory,
 
traditions, and history with practically no hindrance from
 
, ■ Rome. ■ ^' ■ •■ ■ ' 
94. Farmer, p.104, is of the opinion that the Maccabees were a
 
constant reminder of the struggle for political independence in
 
the Judaic kingdom:
 
But if Antiochus Epiphanes was well-known in the Roman
 
period, how can we doubt that the Jews who led Israel to
 
ultimate victory over his armies were equally well-known?
 
This is, of course, a point we shall seek to demonstrate
 
in the following chapter, namely that the Maccabees were
 
remembered in the Roman period.
 
95. Mendel, p.196.
 
96. Mendel, pgs.199-200, outlines the various groups that
 
existed at the time of the Roman occupation and either cooperated
 
with or opposed the regime:
 
During this period, within the Jewish society of Palestine,
 
there were essentially three attitudes regarding Jewish
 
nationalism...The first attitude was more open to
 
Hellensitic influence. This group included the liberal
 
element•to be found in the higher classes of Jewish society
 
and some of its intellectuals who favored Rome's rule in
 
the ecumene. The high priestly houses should also be
 
included in this group...The second attitude was held by all
 
those religious Jews who did not interfere in the politics
 
of their day, many of whom were Pharisees and Essenes, and
 
who wished to go on peacefully with their studies...The
 
third attitude was held by those Jews who were imbued with
 
strong nationalistic feelings and who did not give up the
 
desire for Jewish independence in Palestine.
 
97. Mendel, p.199.
 
98. Martin Warner, ed. The Bible as Rhetoric: Studies in
 
Biblical Persuasion and Cresdibilitv (London: Routledge, 1990)
 
p.197.
 
99. Firestone, p.104, asserts that "Because of its [holy war
 
theory's] formulation long after the consolidation of the nation,
 
fighting based on its specific formulation may have never
 
actually taken place".
 
100. Michael Walzer, in an article entitled "The Idea of Holy War
 
in Ancient Israel" (Journal of Religious Ethics, Fall^92 v.20)
 
pgs.223-224, claims that the mercenary nature of Josiah's army
 
prevented him from waging effective war against his neighbors.
 
This cannot be entirely true, for Judah Maccabeus possessed a
 
similar army and was able to prevail in his struggle against the
 
Seleucids.
 
101. Tertullian in his "Apologia", a segment of which appears in
 
Jean Comby's How to Read Church Historv. v.l (New York: The
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Crossroads Publishing Co., 1989) p.36, reminded Romans wary of
 
the Christian menace: "We sail with you, we serve as soldiers
 
with you and till the ground and engage in trade".
 
102. Henry ChaHwicV. The Earlv Church (London: Penguin Books,
 
1967) p.25-29.
 
103. St. Paul, in Eph"6:12-17 of the New American Bible, St.
 
Joseph's edition, (New York: Catholic Publishing Co., 1970)
 
exhorted Christians to:
 
Stand fast with truth as the belt around your waist, justice
 
as your breastplate, and zeal to propagate the gospel of
 
peace as your footgear,
 
St. Ignatius of Antioch, himself one of the second century
 
martyrs, echoed this Pauline sentiment in his "Letter to
 
Polycarp", included in Anne Fremantle's Treasury of Earlv
 
Christianity (New York: Mentor Books, 1960) p.42:
 
Let your baptism abide with you as your shield; your faith
 
as your helmet; your love as your spear; your patience as
 
your body armour.
 
104. St. Paul, in Rm.13:1-3 of the New American Bible stated that
 
it was the duty of every Christian to:
 
Obey the authorities that are over him, for there is no
 
authority except from God, and all authority that exists is
 
established by God.
 
St. Justin Martyr, on the other hand, in his "Dialogue with
 
Trypho", referenced in a multi-volumed work entitled The Fathers
 
of the Church, v.6 (Washington D.C.: The Catholic University of
 
America, 1965) p.318, articulated the second century Christian
 
ideal:
 
And we who delighted in war, in the slaughter of one
 
another, and in every other kind of iniquity, have in
 
every part of the world converted our weapons into
 
implements of peace.
 
105. The New Thnerican Bible,(Mt.22:21).
 
106. Terullian's "Chaplet", translated by Edwin A. Quain in The
 
Fathers of the Church, v.40 (New York: Fathers of the Church
 
Inc., 1959) p.257, discussed the plight of previously baptised
 
Christians:
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To leave the camp of light and enlist in the camp of
 
darkness means going over to the enemy. To be sure, the
 
case is different for those converted after they have been
 
bound to the military.
 
On a theoritical note, Tertullian, p.256, appealed to Christian
 
Scripture as well:
 
Is it likely we are permitted to carry a sword when our Lord
 
said that he who takes the sword will perish by the sword?
 
Will the son of peace who is forbidden to engage in a law
 
suit espouse the deeds of war?
 
107. Tertullian's oppostion (referenced in Quain's translation)
 
p.256, to military service based on anti-pagan sentiment rather
 
than pacifistic commitment is only too apparent in his concluding
 
remarks of the "Ghaplet":
 
Will [the Christian] stanguard before temples that he has
 
renounced? Will he eat at pagan banquets, which the
 
Apostle forbids? Will he protect by night those very
 
demons whom in daytime he has put to flight by his
 
.exorcisms; leaning on a lance such as pierced the , side, of
 
Christ on the cross? Will he bear too a standard hostile
 
to Christ?
 
108. Hippolytus, in his "Apostolic Tradition" (referenced in
 
Comby) pgs.49.-50, extended the restrictions of Christian service
 
in the army to those baptised after their enlistment; urging such
 
Christians to refrain from the taking of human life (37).
 
In an epistle sent to Diognetus in 200 C.E. (referenced in
 
Fremantle), an anonymous third century author concluded:
 
Force is not an attribute of God. He sent Him as summoning,
 
not as persecuting; He sent Him as loving, not as Judging.
 
109. Mt.5:9 of the New American Bible lists among the
 
beatitudes,"Blest too are the peacemakers, they shall be called
 
sons of God." Mt.26:52 reads, "Those who use the sword are
 
sooner or later destroyed by it." Lk.6:27-28 exhorts Christians
 
to:
 
Love your enemies, do good to those who hate you; bless
 
those who curse you and pray for those who maltreat you.
 
When someone slaps you on one cheek, turn and give him the
 
other.
 
Jn.l8:36 recounts the words of Jesus as he was accused of :
 
political agitation:
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My kingdom does not belong to this world. If my kingdom
 
were of this world/ my subjects would be fighting [italics
 
added] to save me from being handed over to the Jews. As it
 
is, my kingdom is not here.
 
110. Mt.8:5-13 of the New American Bible tells the storv of the
 
Roman centurion who asked Jesus to cure his servant. Jesus did
 
not require the centurion to resign his post, rather, he
 
commended him for his faith. In Mt.10:34-36, Jesus announces:
 
Do not suppose that my mission is to spread peace. My
 
mission is to spread, not peace, but division. I have
 
come to set a man at odds with his father, a daughter with
 
her mother, a daughter-in-law with her mother-in-law: in
 
short, to make a man's enemies those of his own household.
 
The parable contained in Lk.l4:23 seems to suggest that the
 
element of force was not eschewed by God:
 
The master then said to the servant "Go out into the high
 
ways and along the hedgerows and force them to come in. I
 
want my house to be full."
 
In a very ambigous discourse, contained in Lk.22:36, Jesus
 
remarked:
 
Now, however, the man who has a purse must carry it; the
 
same with the travelling bag. And the man without a sword
 
must sell his coat and buy one.
 
The wrath of Jesus visited upon the money-changers in the temple,
 
as discussed in Jn.2:15, was conveniently ignored by pacifist
 
perhaps because of its violent themes.
 
111. Even as late as the fifth century C.E., Augustine, in his
 
"Reply to Faustus the Manichaean" contained in Philip Schaff's
 
Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church, v.4 (New
 
York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1901) p.221, could claim:
 
Most Christian sects, and, is well known, the Catholics,
 
pay no regard to what is prescribed in the writings of
 
Moses.
 
112. Even as early as the first century, St. Ignatius of Antioch,
 
in his "Letter to the Romans", recorded in Eusebius' The History
 
of the Church. G.A. Williamson, trans. (London: Penguin Books,
 
1988) p.146, wrote:
 
Let fire and cross, encounters with wild animals, tearing
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apart of bones, hacking of limbs, crushing of the whole
 
body, tortures of the devil, come upon me if only I might
 
attain to Jesus Christ♦ 
By the second century C.E., the connection between suffering and 
Christian healing had become even more pronounced. In an 
anonymous account of the the martyrdoms at Vienne and Lyons,
reproduced by Eusebius, pgs.196-197, the following descriptions 
of various martyrs served as a powerful example: 
But the blessed woman, wrestling magnificently, grew in 
strength as she proclaimed her faith and found/ refreshment, 
rest and insensibility to her sufferings...Thiis, through the 
grace of Christ, his second spell on the rack proved to be 
not punishment but cure [italics added] .. .On the rack she 
came to her senses and, so to speak, awoke out of a deep
sleep, reminded by the brief chastisement of the eternal 
punishment in Hell.. .from then on she insisted she was a 
Christian [italics added] . 
113. Michael Grant, The History of Rome (United States: Michael 
Grant, 1978) p.405. 
114. Comby, p.73. 
115. The Chief historian of the period, Eusebius, p.414, relates: 
Thus, all tyranny had been purged away [italics added] and 
the kingdom that was theirs was preserved securely and 
without question for Constantine and his sons alone. They, 
having made it their first task to wipe the world clear from 
hatred of God, rejoiced in the blessings that He had con 
ferred upon them. 
116. Comby, p.72. 
117. From Augustine *s "Letters", referenced in Comby, p.74, we 
have the following: 
I do not propose to compel men to embrace the communion of 
any party, but desire the truth to be made known to persons 
who, in their search for it, are free from disquieting 
apprehensions. 
118. Chadwick, p.233. 
119. From Augustine's "Letters", referenced in Comby, p.74.. 
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 120. From St.; Vincent of Lerins' "A Commonitor:y"v Included in
 
Fremantley pgs.321-323. Other sources critical of Christian
 
militancy may be found in Fremantle's collection, pgs.31'7-319:
 
Socrates Scholasticus, in his "Murder of Hypatia", asserted:
 
The professors of Christian religion should be no fighters,
 
they ought to be fur frdia committing murder and bloodshed
 
with other such horrible offenses.
 
JUiticipating the pleas for laercy ti^ical of the Inquisitorial
 
Courts of the Late Medieval period by almost eight hundred years,
 
St. Martin (a prominent fifth century Christian) was said, by
 
Sulpicius Severus in his "St. Martin and the Condemnation of
 
Priscillan", p.319, to have: "Constantly pleaded with Maximus [a
 
prosecutor of heresy] not to shed the blood of the unfortunate
 
defendants."
 
121. In Augustine's "Letter to Publicola", referenced in
 
Fremantle, pgs.124-125, the learned scholar of Late Antiquity
 
maintained:
 
Everyone, as the Apostle says, hath his proper gift of God,
 
one after this manner, and another after that. Some then,
 
in praying for you, fight against your invisible enemies;
 
you, in fighting for them, contend against the barbarians,
 
their visible enemies.
 
122. Augustine's'City of God, translated by Gerald G. Walsh, , .
 
Demetrius B. Zema, Grace Monahan and Daniel Honan (New York:
 
Image Books, 1958) p.447.
 
123. Although Augustine never used the term "holy war" in his
 
writings, it is clear, on p.57 of The Citv of God, what was
 
meant:
 
The same divine law which forbids the killing of a human 
being allows certain exceptions [italics added]. As when 
God authorizes killing by a general law or when he gives 
an explicit commission to an individual for a limited time. 
Since the agent of the authority is but a sword in the hand 
[italics added], and is is not responsible for the killing, 
it is in no way contrary to the commandment "Thou shalt not 
kill" to wage war at God's bidding [italics added] of for 
the representatives of the state's authority to put 
criminals to death, according to the law or rule of rational 
justice. 'b/ ■ 
124. Orusius, in his "Seven Books of History Against the Pagans",
 
referenced in Comby, p.119, was of the opinion:
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 It would seem that the mercy of God ought to be praised and
 
glorified in that so many nations would be receiving, even
 
at the cost of our own weakening, a knowledge of the truth
 
which they never could have had but for this opportunity.
 
125. Theodoric, in his "Letter to Unigis the Sword Bearer",
 
included in Brian Tierney's The Middle Ages:Sources of Medieval
 
History, v.1 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1983) p.45, emphasized
 
the greater accomplishments of a king:
 
Let other kings desire the glory of battles won, of cities
 
taken, of ruins made; our purpose is, God helping us, so to
 
rule that our subjects shall grieve that they did not
 
earlier acquire the blessings of our dominion.
 
Regarding divergent views of religious ideas and principles,
 
Theodoric (same page) even appeared "open minded":
 
We cannot command the religion of our subjects, since no one 
. can be forced to believe against his will. ■ 
126. From the "Letters of Leo the Great", contained in The
 
Fathers of the Churchi v.34 (Washington B.C.: Fathers of the
 
Church Inc., 1957) p.295.
 
127. Leo, in his "Letters", p.295, observed:
 
Although military service can be free from fault and
 
marriage can be honorable, to have given up the choice
 
of better things [italics added] is a sin.
 
128. Pope Felix II (482 C.E.) made the following claim in the
 
face of the Byzantine Imperium:
 
The Emperor is a son of the Church. In matters of faith he
 
must learn not teach. By God's will, the direction of the
 
Church belongs to the bishops, not to the civil power.
 
Karl Baus, Hans-Georg Beck, Eugen Ewig and Josef Vogt, The
 
Imperial Church from Constantine to the Early Middle Aaes.
 
contained in The History of the Church, v.2. Anselm Biggs, trans.
 
(New York: The Seabury Press, 1980) p.616. Hereafter cited as .
 
Biggs, V/2^v.'.. - '' '
 
■ 129. Grant, p.454.: ; 
130. Nineteen years before his conversion, ecclesiastical advice
 
to the Prankish king (referenced in Patrick Geary's Readings in
 
Medieval History (Peterborough, Ontario: Broadview Press, 1989)
 
  
p.157, included the following:
 
^	 Encourage your people, relieve the afflicted, proteGt
 
Widows/ hourish orphans, so shine forth that all may 
 v 
'love; and/fear.you. ■ ; 
131. Tierney, pgs.45-46.
 
■132. "'Biggsr. y.l'r ;.,p. 52-7 . ■ - '■/■ ■," ■ ..//■';■; 
133. Biggs, v.2, p.528, offers ample evidence of the chaotic 
state of sixth century affairs, as, for example, when the 
Burgundians■reversed themselves and supported Theodoric in his 
protection of Mediterranean lands from the emerging hegemony of 
the Franks. ■ ■ . ■^. ■; 
134. Biggs, v.2, p.532. 
135. The typical response to a perceived slight to Prankish 
interests was recorded by Gregory of Tours in his "History of the 
Franks", referenced in J.M. Wallace-Hadrill's The Long Haired ■ 
Kings (New York: Barnes & Noble Inc., 1962) p.133: 
But Guntramn's implacable hatred, it must be emphasized, had 
to do with avenging the death of Ingundis. He will not, he 
says, receive an embassy from the Visigoth Reccared "donee 
me Deus ulcisci iubeat de his inimicus" nether should his 
other niece, Chlodosind, go as bride to the land where her 
V. 	 sister was slain—"I cannot tolerate it that my niece
 
/ Ingundis should go unavenged".
 
136. Raymond Van Dam, in his authoritative work entitled, ' 
Leadership and Community in Late Antiaue Gaul (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1985) p.127, claims that: 
/ ■■ 	 Martin's perspective on Christianity therefore not only 
provided a model that renewed and redirected traditional 
ideologies of authority onto himself, it also challenged ■ 
the position of Christian bishops who had adopted a more 
accomodating attitude toward civil authority. , Martin saw 
Christianity as a military service of its own competing with 
the military and civil authorities; other bishops in Gaul, 
, who had always been civilians, were instead prepared to
 
; coexist with the military and civil authorities. In
 
Martin's bishops could, and perhaps should, take over the 
functions of emperors and magistrates; in the alternative 
perspective, bishops only advised emperors. Not 
surprisingly, much of the opposition to him came from other 
bishops. Although Martin eventually decided to keep his 
distance by claiitiirig ttiat association with other bishops
 
diminished his spiritual power, his opponents in turn
 
asserted hhat he had "defiled himself with his military
 
actions"—an explicit comment on Martin's past but perhaps
 
also an implicit evaluation of his idea of militant
 
Christianity.
 
137. Edward James, in his The Franks (Oxford: Basil Blackwell,
 
1988), p.125, asserts that:
 
The difficulty for the Church, and for us, is that of
 
separating those customs which were genuinely non-Christian
 
from those which were simply deep-rooted social habits or
 
communal activities. Gregory reported that the Franks of
 
his day referred to dies dominions, the Lord's Day,
 
dimanche, as dies solis, Sunday: he and many churchmen of
 
his time regarded this as a shameful survival of pagan
 
worship. And yet, Mercurii dies, mercredi, Woden's day, and
 
Jovis dies, Jeudi, Thor's day, are still with us.
 
138. Biggs, v.2, p.629. ■, 
139. Gregory's correspondence with the Emperor, referenced in 
Tierney, p.65, demonstrates the emerging sense of "two armies" 
(similar to the "two swords" theory) typical of this period: 
Let your piety, either by interpretation or alteration, 
modify the force of this law, since the army of my lords 
against their enemies increases the more when the army of 
God has been increased in prayer. 
140. Tierney, p.99. 
141. Tierney, p.100. 
142. C. Warren Hollister, in his work entitled Medieval Europe. A 
Short Historv. 6th ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill Publishing Co., 
1990) p.91, asserts: 
But although Charlemagne respected the papacy, he was 
unwilling to cast himself in the subordinate role papal 
theory demanded of him. He was careful to retain the 
title "King of the Franks and the Lombards" alongside his 
new imperial title. When the time came to crown his son 
emperor, Charles excluded the pope from the ceremony and 
did the honors himself. 
143. Norman F. Cantor, The Civilization of the Middle Aaes (New 
York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1993) p.81. 
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144. Lewis Thorpe/ trans., Einhard's "The Life of Charlemagne", 
contained in Two Lives of Charlemagne (Middlesex: Penguin Books, 
19B31 ■p.;78./V 
145. 	Thomas Bokenkotter, A Concise History of the Catholic ChUrch 
(United States: Image Books, 1979) p.116. 
146. A clear indication that Charles knew the value of religious 
ideology ih the oreation of a political state is contained in the 
Carolingian monarch's correspondence with Pope Leo. Upon hearing
papal criticisms of his tactics, Charles sent Leo ah angry
IpttAr^ referenced in The Catholic Encvclooedia. v.3, Charles G. 
Herbermann, ed. (New York: The Encyclopedia Press, 1913) p.700: 
My part is to defend the Church by force of arms from 
external attacks and to secure her internally through 
the establishment of the Catholic faith; your part is to 
render us the assistance of prayer. 
147. Freiderich Kempf, Hans-Georg Beck, Eugen Ewig and Josef 
Adreas Jungman, The Church in the Acre of Feudalism, translated by 
Anselm Biggs in The Historv of the Christian Church.; v.3 (New 
York: Crossroads Publishing Co., 1982) pgs.131-132. Hereafter 
cited as Biggs, v.3. 
148. Biggs, v.3, pgs.138-139. 
149. Biggs, v.3, p.141. 
150. Biggs, v.3, p.295. 
151. The intensity of Gregory's rhetoric against Henry was 
evident in Paul of Bernried's account of the pope's 
interpretation of a miraculous sign, included in Arnold Harris 
Matthews' The Life and Times of Hildebrand (London: Francis 
Griffiths, 1910) p.109: 
This was interpreted by the pope as follows: the egg was 
the Church; the serpent, the emblem of evil, stood for 
Gregory, in his correspondences referenced in Ephraim Emerton's 
The Correspondence of Pope Gregory VII (New York: W.W. Norton and 
Co., 1960) , ,p.101, would eventually appeal to Old Testament ■ 
justifications for war in his attempts to galvanize support among 
the German nobles: 
For as we are subject to the word of the prophet: "If thou 
speakest not to warn the wicked from his wicked way...his 
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 soul will I require at thine hand "Gursed be lie
 
that shall hold back his sword from blood", that is, shall
 
hold back the sword of reproof from smiting those of evil
 
' ■	 life.'- . 
Finally, in his Sppeal to the German nobility as referenced in
 
Emerton, p.101, Hildebrand declared:
 
But if he will not listen to you and shall choose to
 
follow the Delil rather than Christ and shall prefer
 
the counsel of those who have long been under excommunica
 
tion for simoniacal heresy to yours then we shall find
 
ways, under divine inspiration, to rescue the already
 
declining Church Universal by serving God rather than man.
 
152. For an excellent appraisal of Gregory's struggle with Henry
 
as a prototype of the holy war, or crusade, refer to the work of
 
Carl Erdmann: The Origin of the Idea of Crusading (Princeton;
 
Princeton University Press, 1977).
 
153. Biggs, v.3, p.445.
 
154. Biggs, v.3, p.445.
 
155. Steven Runciman, The First Crusade (Cambridge: Cambridge
 
University Press, 1992) p.29.
 
156. Malcolm Billings, The Crusades (New York: Sterling
 
Publishing Co., 1996) p.19. '
 
157. The relevant sections of Urban's address, as referenced in
 
Tierney, pgs.155-156, are as follows:
 
Now that you, 0 sons of God, have consecrated yourselves to
 
God to maintain peace among yourselves more vigorously and
 
.	 to uphold the laws of the Church faithfully, there is work
 
to do, for you must turn the strength of your sincerity, now
 
that you are aroused by divine correction, to another affair
 
that concerns you and God. Hastening to the way, you must
 
help your brothers living in the Orient, who need your aid
 
for which they have already cried out many times. For, as
 
-	 most of you have been told, the Turks, a race of Persians,
 
who have penetrated within the boundaries of Romania even to
 
the Mediterranean to that point which they call the Arm of
 
Saint George, in occupying more and more of the lands of the
 
Christians, have overcome them, already victims of seven
 
battles, and have killed and captured them, have overthrown
 
churches, and have laid waste God's kingdom...Let those who
 
are accustomed to wage private wars wastefully, even against
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believers, go forth against the infidels in a battle worthy
 
to be undertaken now and to be finished in victory. Now,
 
let those who until recently existed as plunderers, be
 
soldiers of Christ; now let those who formerly contended
 
against brothers and relations, rightly fight barbarians...
 
Nay, more, the sorrowful here will be glad there, the poor
 
here will be rich there.
 
158. R■C■ Smai1. in his Crusading Warfare (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1967) p.18, declares the following: 
It was Delbruck's opinion that the principles of strategy 
could not be applied to Crusading warfare, because the 
Crusades were born of mystical rather than political 
motives. Certainly, the preaching of the First Crusade 
appealed to Christian abhorrence of Islam; but from the 
first other motives were present [italics added], and the 
crusade included, beside Peter the Hermit, land hungry 
Normans and the Genoese, eager to exploit commercial 
opportunity. 
159. Smail, p.18. 	 v 
160. Jonathan Riley-Smith, The First Crusade and the Idea of 
Crusading (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1986) 
pgs.55 and 61. 
161. 	James M. Powell, Anatomy of a Crusade: 1213-1221 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1986) p.53. 
162. Frederick Russell, Just War in the Middle Aaes (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1975) p.61. 
163. Hollister, p.196. 
164. 	This is to be distinguished from the concept of qital 
(fighting) referenced in Kelsay and Johnson's Cross. Crescent and 
Sword, p.37. 
165. For the typical orientalist perspective of early Islamic 
expansion, one need look no further than F.E. Peter's Muhammed 
and the Origins of Islam (New York: State University of New York 
Press, 1994) p.211: "Muhammed, with power now in his hands", , 
Peters asserts, "set his community on the path of aggressive 
political violence." The apologetic view may be gleaned from 
such authors as Hazrat Mirza Tahir Ahmad who admirably,.if 
somewhat naively, argues for Islamic pacifism in his work 
entitled Murder in the Name of Allah (Cambridge: Lutterworth 
Press, 1989) p.18: "It is amazing that a Muslim scholar could 
even by impiicatidn suggest that the prophet was guilty of a^ ;
 
Hitler-style invasion-Waaudhu billah. The Prophet was a . prince
 
of peace, not an invader."
 
166. N.J. Dawood, trans. The Koran (London: Penguin Books, 1994)
 
and Mohhamed Marmaduke Pickthall, trans, and comm. The Glorious
 
Koran (New York: Mentor Books, 1963). The following ayats, or
 
verses, serve as a compelling example of the disparity between
 
Dawood's and Pickthall's translations and indicate an apparent
 
bias on the part of DawOod in his treatment of jihad: 2:191-193
 
and 2:216. In Dawood's translation, 2:191 reads as follows:
 
"Idolatry is more grievous than bloodshed." This obviously
 
infers that war may be waged (even offensively) against
 
idolaters, especially those who "offend" Allah. Contrast this
 
with Pickthall's translation of the same ayat: "Persecution is
 
worse than slaughter." The latter translation evidently stresses
 
violence as a response to oppression. Even Kenneth Cragg, in his
 
Readings in the Our'an (London: Fount, 1988) p.229, admits an
 
alternative interpretation of the verse: "subversion is worse
 
than slaughter." Interestingly, both persecution and subversion
 
are elements of political environments, removed somewhat from the
 
religious agenda. Similarly, Dawood's translation of 1:93 reads:
 
"Fight against them until Idolatry is no more and God's religion
 
reigns supreme." Pickthall again delineates persecution, not .
 
idolatry, as the object of aggression and abjures Muslims to
 
fight "until religion is for Allah", a much less severe
 
qualification for the cessation of hostilities. In 2:216,
 
Dawood's translation maintains: "warfare is obligatory for you",
 
while Pickthall's affirms: "warfare is ordained for;you." The
 
first prescribes a clearly recognized duty of the Muslim to wage
 
war on God's behalf, while the second merely suggests it may be
 
one's fate, given the hostile environment of Quraysh oppression,
 
to fight. These are but three examples of a consistent trend
 
throughout Dawood's work in which variations in emphasis are
 
created, a word is added here, a word omitted there, meanings are
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